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Executive Summary
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has requested that the Mineta
Transportation Institute’s National Transportation Security Center of Excellence (MTI
NTSCOE) provide any research it has or insights it can provide on the security risks created
by the highway transportation of hazardous materials. This request was submitted to MTI
NTSCOE as a National Transportation Security Center of Excellence. In response, MTI
NTSCOE reviewed and revised research performed in 2007 and 2008 and assembled a
small team of terrorism and emergency-response experts, led by Center Director Brian
Michael Jenkins, to report on the risks of terrorists using highway shipments of flammable
liquids (e.g., gasoline tankers) to cause casualties anywhere, and ways to reduce those
risks. This report has been provided to DHS.
The team’s first focus was on surface transportation targets, including highway infrastructure,
and also public transportation stations. As a full understanding of these materials, and
their use against various targets became revealed, the team shifted with urgency to the
far more plentiful targets outside of surface transportation where people gather and can
be killed or injured. However, the team is concerned to return to the top of the use of
these materials against public transit stations and recommends it as a separate subject for
urgent research.
The following is a summary of key judgments:
●● The national threat level remains at yellow, indicating an “elevated” threat. Al
Qaeda’s leaders and those inspired by its exhortations remain determined to carry
out terrorist attacks on American targets abroad and in the United States.
●● The number of significant jihadist terrorist attacks, outside of Afghanistan and
Iraq, declined in 2007 and 2008, and a greater number of terrorist plots have been
uncovered and thwarted in the early stages. Terrorist plots uncovered in the United
States since 9/11 have been characterized by local planning and low skill levels.
Al Qaeda-inspired terrorists, currently the most formidable terrorist threat, remain committed
to large-scale bombings requiring vehicle-borne explosives.1 VBIEDs continue to be a
preferred attack mode when high body counts and massive damage are the objectives.
(Not all terrorist organizations seek high body counts. Environmentalist extremists, for
example, seek spectacular property damage.)
●● The acquisition or manufacture of large quantities of explosives by terrorists is
difficult, and it has been made more so by increased security and monitoring of
ingredients such as ammonium nitrate fertilizer—a common ingredient in explosive
devices when mixed with fuel oil.
●● Terrorists, notably in Iraq, have attempted to increase the lethality of their devices by
adding propane tanks or toxic chemicals to them. Reports indicate that terrorists have
also discussed substituting available hazardous materials for explosives, although
it is not clear whether these discussions relate exclusively to the continuing conflict
in Iraq. This possibility has also been mentioned in recent U.S. threat assessments.
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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Recent assessments also suggest that terrorists are considering how to weaponize
gasoline tankers.
●● While any specific type of terrorist attack against any specific category of target
remains unpredictable, although of low statistical probability, the use of vehicles
carrying hazardous-materials cargos as surrogate truck bombs must be considered
a plausible mode of terrorist attack.

		

●● Although terrorists prefer truckloads of stolen or fabricated explosives, they could
also turn trucks carrying flammable liquids, flammable gases, or toxic inhalants into
weapons.
●● Spectacular accidents involving flammable liquids and gases and evacuations
resulting from spilled loads of toxic inhalants provide inspiration. Reports of
tanker thefts indicate vulnerabilities. These reports indicate that a terrorist thief or
hijacker could count on many hours of driving—and perhaps days, if the truck were
hidden—before being discovered. There would be ample time to get the tanker to
the target.
●● Trucks carrying hazardous materials other than military or commercial explosives
are ubiquitous and are less guarded than explosives shipments. They would appeal
to terrorists with fewer resources—e.g., local conspiracies and lone operators—and
especially to conspirators with insider knowledge or access to the industry.
●● The federal government focuses on consequences, devoting the greatest attention
and finite resources—and therefore the most-stringent security mandates—to the
transport of cargos capable of causing the greatest casualties. Terrorists, driven by
operational constraints, might look at things very differently, focusing their efforts on
the most readily available, least protected hazardous cargos—flammable liquids.
●● Gasoline tankers theoretically offer terrorists several operational attractions. They
vastly outnumber all other hazardous-materials shipments combined. They operate
in urban areas—target-rich environments. Their routes are predictable. They pose
security challenges.
●● We therefore consider gasoline tankers and, to a lesser extent, propane tankers to
be the most attractive options for terrorists seeking hazardous-materials cargos.
●● The principal threat from gasoline or propane tankers is fire. Without altering the
tanker itself and adjusting its contents, it can be difficult to use a gasoline tanker to
create an explosion; it is even more difficult to use a propane tanker. Creating an
intense fire is far easier. The main limitation in creating an explosion using propane
tankers is that vapors must be released to achieve exactly the right mixture of fuel
and air and then ignited. Igniting propane is relatively easy, but causing propane to
explode, especially at the right time and place, is technically difficult.
●● Forced to choose between undertaking a complex and demanding operation to
cause massive death and destruction and executing a smaller-scale attack with
certainty of success, terrorists seem generally to choose the latter. Terrorists may
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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be willing to sacrifice their lives; they are far less willing to risk operational failure.
●● Operational success tends to be defined in terms of casualties. Terrorists seek
targets that have emotional or symbolic value—widely recognizable icons, targets
whose destruction would significantly damage or disrupt the economy, and high
body counts. In recent attacks, terrorists have been willing to forgo iconic value in
favor of high body counts, for example, by bombing subways or commuter trains.
The economic impact of such attacks is indirect.
●● For technical reasons, it is unlikely that terrorists planning to seize a truck loaded with
hazardous materials or already possessing one would choose highway infrastructure
as their primary target. These are difficult attacks to carry out, with relatively little
gain.
●● By contrast, people are the preferred soft target, as we have seen in terrorist attacks
on public transportation systems, and terrorists have demonstrated their preference
for attacking vulnerable public assemblies and residential properties.
●● In that regard, additional research should be conducted on the use of these materials
against public transportation stations where people congregate and from which they
cannot easily escape to determine the extent to which both flammable liquids and
gases, explosives, and even TIH materials might be used, and to determine what
security measures could be adopted to mitigate these risks at these locations. MTI
strongly recommends urgent research along these lines.
●● In the meantime, we recommend that the federal government, state governments,
and industry collaborate to: 							
a. Resolve significant jurisdictional issues between federal and state
authorities
b. Strengthen monitoring and enforcement of hazardous-materials security
measures in the field; and
c.

Work to implement vehicle tracking technologies, panic alarms, and
immobilization capabilities for vehicles carrying large quantities of specific
hazardous materials, including gasoline. These measures offer safety and
anti-crime benefits as well.

●● Flammable liquids—particularly gasoline tankers—pose security threats that should
not be minimized. These security threats are primarily to targets where large numbers
of casualties can be created, and far less so to highway infrastructure.
●● It is possible that the government’s most recent threat assessments will alter current
attitudes. But the authors urge a renewed look at flammable liquids and gases as a
weapon of opportunity to create with relative ease an attack with enough certainty
and enough causalities to make it a cause of national concern.

Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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●● A strategy is needed urgently to strengthen and sustain security measures and
technologies that can reduce the risks caused by highway-borne flammable liquids,
and to a lesser extent, flammable gases, used against both non-transportation, and
transportation targets.
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Introduction
Background
In 2008, building on research performed in 2007, the Mineta Transportation Institute’s
National Transportation Security Center of Excellence assembled a small team of terrorism
and emergency-response experts, led by Center Director Brian Michael Jenkins, to report
on the risks of terrorists using highway shipments of flammable liquids (e.g., gasoline
tankers) to cause casualties anywhere, and ways to reduce those risks.
The team’s first focus was on surface transportation targets, including highway infrastructure,
and also public transportation stations. As a full understanding of these materials, and
their use against various targets became revealed, the team shifted with urgency to the
far more plentiful targets outside of surface transportation where people gather and can
be killed or injured. However, the team is concerned to return to the top of the use of
these materials against public transit stations and recommends it as a separate subject for
urgent research
This research is being provided to DHS which has requested MTI’s assistance in examining
the use of highway-borne hazmat as a weapon.
The team has sanitized its previous findings to make the report appropriate for a wider
audience at an unclassified level. Any material that could provide terrorists with specific
information not otherwise widely available concerning vulnerabilities and how to exploit
them has been eliminated.
The team included:
1. Billy Poe, a nationally recognized expert on explosives and explosive devices and a
retired Louisiana State Police official. He has served as Director of the International
Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators (IABTI).
2. Douglas Reeves, an engineer by training who served for many years in the DOT’s
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and its predecessor
agency. Most recently, he led the risk-management team, served as deputy director of
the technology division, and served as a focal point for hazardous-materials security
issues after the 9/11 attacks.
3. Karl Shrum, a former Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) hazardous-materials
investigator in the state of California who also helped craft many aviation security rules
and policies in the Federal Aviation Administration. He spent more than five years at
TSA, where he focused on security measures for hazardous-materials shipments
4. Joseph Trella, an active duty officer in the U.S. Army during the 1990s who also served
as senior policy analyst for the National Governors Association and as special assistant
for homeland security to the governor of Maryland.
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Introduction

6

MTI took a broad look at terrorist thinking, targets, and operational considerations involved
in weaponized hazmat to determine the relative likelihood of attacks using highway-borne
hazmat against various targets across the country. The methodology used by the MTI
team was an informal one that made extensive use of both current data and analyses from
multiple sources and individual team specialties and experiences. The team met multiple
times, both physically and by telephone. The methodology that was used is described
below and is shaped by posing and answering six key questions that are listed here.
The methodology requires detailed examination of hazardous materials and hazardous
materials regulations, which in turn requires the use of a number of acronyms. A list of all
acronyms used in the report is provided on 51.
Hazmat Examined in this Report
•

Flammable liquids, such as gasoline

•

Flammable gases, such as propane

•

Truckload explosives, such as ammonium nitrate fuel oil (ANFO)

•

Toxic-inhalation-hazard (TIH) materials (such as chlorine*)

*Included only to help assess the likelihood of the other three materials being used and against which targets.

Outline of This Report
The chapter titled “Commodity Flows” provides information on the overall frequency and
routing of each hazardous material considered. Toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) materials
are included, even though they have no effect on infrastructure, because attacks involving
them must be considered in analyzing terrorist targets and weapons and in determining
the probability of hazmat being used to destroy highway infrastructure.
The chapter titled “Potential Destructive Effects of Hazardous Materials Used in Acts
of Terrorism” describes the average and maximum destructive effects of each of the
materials considered. All potential targets are included, and are not limited to highway
infrastructure.
The chapter titled “Public Information that Could Inspire and Inform Terrorists” outlines
publicly available information on hazardous materials that might inspire terrorists to use
them and could potentially educate them on how to acquire, deliver, and release them
for maximum effect. This information includes descriptions of (1) accidents, especially
spectacular accidents; (2) criminal activity; and (3) disposal operations for hazardous
materials involved in derailments and other accidents.
The chapter titled “Current State of Security Regulation and Recommended Practices
for the Highway Transportation of Hazardous Materials” summarizes security measures
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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required or recommended by the federal and state governments and by industry, and it
assesses how these measures are being implemented by companies, based on the results
of site visits. This section also includes observations on vehicle tracking, panic buttons,
and immobilization technologies. A supplemental report on vehicle tracking has been
presented to DHS separately, and is available as MTI publication 09-04, Implementation
and Development of Vehicle Tracking and Immobilization Technologies.
The chapter titled “Analysis of the Threat and Potential Attacks” presents the core analysis
of the study. We provide a general threat overview, and then consider how terrorists might
consider using flammable liquids, flammable gases, and truckload explosives against all
types of targets. We ask and answer five questions:
1. How do terrorists think about targets? We examine the words, plots, and attacks of
terrorist groups in general and jihadists in particular to prioritize targets and determine
how attractive highway infrastructure is to terrorists.
2. Assuming terrorists have access to specific hazardous materials, what targets
might be most attractive? After determining this set of targets, we then assume that
Jihadist groups have acquired flammable liquids, flammable gases, truckload explosives,
or TIH materials, and we determine which material works best against which target.
3. How do operational considerations influence material and
target selection? We examined several operational considerations:
(1) How frequently do the materials move and how easy are those movements to
predict? (2) How well are the materials protected? (3) How much might terrorists actually
know about the destructive capabilities of the materials? (4) What kind of technical and
operational modifications would be required to increase the chances of creating an
explosion or fire? (5) What are the probabilities and consequences of a successful
attack? We have sanitized the details of these considerations.
4. How does the sophistication of the terrorist group affect material and target
selection? We place jihadist terrorists into three distinct groups: lone operators, local
al Qaeda-inspired cells, and a cell centrally-funded and directed by al Qaeda with
considerable resources and planning time. We consider how materials can be acquired
and delivered to targets, how reconnaissance of targets might be conducted, and how
the materials might have to be released. We determine the attack sequences that are
most likely to be performed by the different types of terrorist groups or individuals.
5. What kinds of attacks using highway-borne hazmat are terrorist groups most
likely to conduct? Using all of the information we developed about targets, hazardous
materials, operational considerations, and terrorist groups, we consider how some of
the more likely attacks would be carried out, why, and against which targets.
We conclude with some confidence that truck-borne hazardous materials are unlikely to
be used to target highway infrastructure. Iconic targets such as the Brooklyn Bridge worth
attacking are unlikely to be destroyed, and those that can be destroyed are not worth
attacking. By contrast, the use of hazardous materials—particularly gasoline and to a
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lesser degree propane tankers—against public buildings and gatherings is a cause for
much greater concern. These gatherings can include large numbers of people gathered
in mass transit stations, which MTI’s own database suggests are targets of bombings
and incendiary attacks. We also conclude that while government and industry tend to be
dismissive of the security threats from flammable liquids, flammable liquids—particularly
gasoline tankers—pose security threats that should not be minimized.
This key judgment, and others, predate recently issued government assessments
that stress that because of the difficulty of acquiring explosives, terrorists are turning
to flammable liquids and to tankers, from which the principal threat is fire used against
public assemblies or residential targets, and other assessments that al Qaeda is using its
engineering capabilities to consider how to best weaponize gasoline tankers.
Clearly, gasoline tankers and, to a lesser extent, propane tankers, are important weapons
of opportunity. They can be used create fires tsuhat could cause significant casualties in
attacks on public and residential targets, a possible threat the federal government has
recently addressed. While the size of the fleet and its importance to the economy pose real
challenges in terms of implementing countermeasures, this should not cause government
and industry to avoid facing the risks they pose, and creating a strategy for strengthening
and sustaining security measures.
It is a challenge we need to face up to.
MTI’s concern about gasoline tankers predates the most recent government assessments by
many months and is Appendi underscored by them. A year ago, MTI concluded that:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Terrorists have a continuing interest in large truck bombs—vehicle-borne improvised
explosive devices (VBIEDs).
Acquiring and manufacturing explosives and achieving large-scale explosions are a
significant challenge to terrorist groups—especially local groups that lack access to
instruction or out-of-country training.
Given recent increased monitoring of sales of ammonium nitrate, the risks of acquiring this
common ingredient in terrorist truck bombs have increased, and this may push terrorists
toward other, more easily accessible hazmat cargos.
It is known that terrorists have discussed the use of propane, gasoline, and other hazmat to
enhance and/or substitute for conventional explosives.
If terrorists cannot obtain explosives, they turn to the use of fire.
Terrorists have considered gasoline tankers as a potential weapon for creating destructive
fires.
Gasoline tankers could be used with considerable lethality against buildings and public
assemblies.
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Commodity Flows
Why Study Commodity Flows?
In this section, we consider four commodities: flammable liquids, flammable gases,
truckload explosives, and toxic-inhalation-hazard (TIH) materials, such as chlorine, and
we outline how often and where these commodities are transported in the United States.
We include TIH materials because, even though they cannot be used against highway
infrastructure, terrorists will consider using them in attacks.
This analysis is important because it enables us to determine the availability of the materials
during their transportation and how predictably they flow (see “Public Information that
Could Inspire and Inform Terrorists” beginning on page 25). Terrorists are opportunists,
and a commodity that is transported in great volumes and with predictability may be more
desirable than one that flows infrequently or randomly.

Composite Picture of Hazmat Flows
The quality of data on hazmat flows of interest in this study varies. Data on rail flows are
typically much better than data on highway flows. The Commodity Flow Survey conducted
by the Department of Transportation and the Department of Commerce is the best overall
source of data; however, because of survey limitations, it includes only materials that have
significant shipments.
A shipment is defined as a single movement of goods, commodities, or products from an
establishment to a single customer or to another establishment owned or operated by the
originating establishment (e.g., a warehouse, distribution center, or retail or wholesale
outlet). Full or partial truckloads are counted as single shipments only if all commodities
on the truck are destined for the same location. If a truck makes multiple deliveries on a
route, the goods delivered at each stop are counted as individual shipments. For example,
a gasoline tanker that picks up 8,000 gallons at a terminal and delivers it to a gasoline
station would be considered one shipment; a truckload of explosives transported from a
warehouse to two users at different locations would be considered two shipments. DOT has
specific definitions for bulk shipments. What might be generally considered to be a large
shipment varies by commodity. Highway shipments of more than a few thousand gallons
or pounds of the materials of interest in this study would be considered large shipments.
To illustrate how commodity flows affect just one state, MTI looked at a very large state—
California. According to the Commodity Flow Survey, approximately 9% of the total
hazardous material shipped (by weight, for all classes and all modes) in the United States
in 2002 went in or through California. Data from the 2002 Commodity Flow Survey for
the highway shipment of hazardous materials of interest in this study are shown in Table
1 on page 10. Our ballpark estimates of the number of large shipments in California are
also shown. As the table illustrates, when only the largest commodity in each category is
considered, the vast majority of large shipments in California are shipments of gasoline
(82.9%), followed by propane (12.1%). Shipments of anhydrous ammonia (a TIH material)
constitute 3.8%, and explosives shipments constitute 1.3%. Based on a small number of
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chlorine tankers nationwide, the number and percentage of chlorine shipments in California
is considered very small, less than 1%.
Table 1 Selected Hazardous Materials Highway Shipments

Hazardous Material
Explosives—Hazard Class 1
Division 1.5 explosives
Flammable gases—Division 2.1
Petroleum gases (e.g., propane)
Toxic inhalation hazard TIH) materials—
Division 2.3
Anhydrous ammonia
Flammable liquids
Gasoline
Total hazardous material shipment
(all classes)

National
Highway
Tonsa
4,361
3,972
44,031
30,426

Estimateb of
Number of Large % of Large
Shipments
Shipments
in California
in California
35,000

1.3

320,000

12.1

100,000

3.8

2,200,000

82.9

12,574
7,691
948,619
606,724
1,159,514

a In thousands. Source: Department of Transportation and Department of Commerce, Commodity Flow
Survey (CFS) 2002—Hazardous Materials, December 2004.
b Derived by dividing total national highway tons by a typical transport vehicle and scaling for California.

estimated Breakdown of studied commodities on california
Highways
Gasoline Tankers
Propane
Explosives
Chlorine
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Figure 1 Estimated Breakdown of Studied Commodities on Calfornia
Highways
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Flammable Liquids
Given the role of the automobile in American society, it is not surprising that the vast majority
of hazardous material transportation by tonnage involves gasoline. Gasoline is usually
moved to storage terminals by pipeline or vessel. Tank trucks form the last transportation
leg, delivering gasoline from storage terminals or tank farms to gas stations.
Gasoline is usually transported in MC 306 or MC 406 tank trucks2 with four or five
compartments and a nominal 9,000-gallon total capacity. Tank shell construction is
typically of 1/5-inch aluminum. (Weight considerations are a critical factor in gasoline
transportation—the tank trucks that carry flammable and TIH compressed gases under
pressure typically have 5/8- to 3/4-inch steel tanks.) Gasoline trucks are unloaded from the
bottom through hoses attached to lines from each of the compartments, which terminate at
a central location. To discharge the gasoline, the air-pressure system must first be activated
to open the valves. After that, gravity draws the gasoline out.
Annually, there are roughly 19 million truckload shipments of gasoline in the United States.
The average one-way trip from tank farm to gas station covers approximately 35 miles.
Shipments are most often from the source to a single gas station, where the entire content
is unloaded. Gasoline tank truck operation typically runs 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.
In the United States, gasoline is the only hazardous material that has to be transported by
highway this frequently.
Other flammable and combustible materials transported in great quantities by highway in
the United States include diesel fuel and fuel oil. The latter is used extensively in residential
heating and is usually delivered by nominal 3,000-gallon straight trucks. Although these
materials are somewhat more difficult to ignite (this may be of more significance from a
safety standpoint than a security standpoint), they have higher heat content. Users have
easy access to large quantities of these materials outside of transportation (e.g., through
600-gallon residential heating tanks).

Flammable Gases
Propane is the most commonly transported flammable gas. It is used to heat homes
(particularly in rural areas where natural gas is unavailable), for cooking, and to power
vehicles. It is usually transported as a liquefied compressed gas in tank trucks or
cylinders.
Pipelines, vessels, and rail cars move propane to terminals or regional distribution centers.
In addition, nominal 10,000-gallon tank trucks (the national fleet contains approximately
7,000 highway bulk transport trucks) assist in moving propane to local distributors. A
national fleet of approximately 35,000 bobtails, or nominal 3,000-gallon tank trucks, move
the propane to residential users, who typically have a 500-gallon on-site storage tank for
heating. Bobtail deliveries are typically made to a series of customers until the tank truck is
emptied. Bobtail trucks are unloaded though long hoses, using a small pump.
The MC 330 or MC 331 tank truck fleets used to transport propane often alternate between
transporting flammable gases in the winter (heating) season and transporting anhydrous
ammonia during the spring and summer (or agricultural) season.
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Explosives
Explosives are transported for military and commercial uses. Commercial uses are
predominantly in mining and construction. Explosives are transported primarily by
highway.
Division 1.1 explosives (those with a mass explosion hazard) and Division 1.5 explosives
(very insensitive explosives with a mass explosion hazard) are the most important from a
security perspective. Most Division 1.1 explosives are transported for the military, although
a small amount of Division 1.1 explosives is used commercially to initiate Division 1.5
explosives. Division 1.1 explosives account for a minimal amount (by weight) of the total
explosives shipped by highway. Commercial use of Division 1.5 explosives is greater than
military use.
Explosives are typically shipped from the manufacturer to a distributor or end user. Most
Division 1.5 explosives are ammonium nitrate fuel oil (ANFO) mixtures or water gels,
emulsions, or slurries shipped to the sites of usage, such as mining or construction sites,
where they are used to break up or demolish ores or structures. Capacities of bulk trucks
carrying Division 1.5 explosives range from 5 to 15 tons.
Ammonium nitrate is not classified as an explosive during transportation; it is classified
as an oxidizer because of the environment and forces normally encountered during
transportation. However, it causes security concerns because it can be used to create an
explosion when mixed with other materials. Approximately nine million tons of ammonium
nitrate are produced annually in the United States and used in agriculture as a fertilizer
and in the production of explosives, such as ANFO. Ammonium nitrate is shipped by truck,
rail, and vessel. The capacity of a truck carrying bulk quantities of ammonium nitrate is
typically in the range of 20 tons.

Toxic-Inhalation-Hazard (TIH) Materials
Anhydrous ammonia and chlorine are the two TIH materials most commonly shipped
by highway; the majority of these shipments (more than 80 percent) are of anhydrous
ammonia. Other TIH materials relatively frequently shipped by highway include fuming
sulfuric acid, ethylene oxide, sulfur dioxide, bromine, phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, and
hydrogen fluoride.
Anhydrous ammonia is used as a fertilizer, as a feedstock for other chemical manufacturing,
and as a refrigerant. Most of it by far is used as fertilizer. Anhydrous ammonia is transported
in MC 330 and MC 331 tank trucks, portable tanks (nominal 200-gallon), and cylinders
(nominal 20-gallon). Anhydrous ammonia nurse tanks, most with a capacity of 1,000 to
1,500 gallons, are often seen in agricultural applications.
Chlorine has a large number of industrial uses. It is also used as a disinfectant for municipal
water supplies, although there are indications that this use may be decreasing.3
Chlorine is transported by highway in MC 330 or MC 331 tank trucks, “ton” tanks (nominal
200-gallon), or cylinders (nominal 20-gallon). Much more chlorine (in terms of tons or ton
miles) is transported by rail than by highway.
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Potential Destructive Effects of Hazardous
Materials Used in Acts of Terrorism
Hazardous materials transportation has a good safety record. However, that record does
not directly translate to the effects that could be caused by terrorists. One would expect
terrorists to use hazardous materials in a manner that causes maximum destructive
consequences and in ways that are not normally encountered during transportation. For
example, a large quantity of gasoline placed in or close to a large building and ignited
might overwhelm sprinkler systems and other control mechanisms and create a far greater
fire hazard than would normally be expected in transportation. In the case of explosives,
in particular, secondary hazards, such the collapse of a building, tunnel, or bridge, would
exaggerate consequences.
Hazardous materials that might be used to directly attack highway infrastructure such as
overpasses, bridges, or tunnels would likely be flammable liquids, flammable gases, or
explosives. Use of highway infrastructure can be seriously affected by uncertainty about
the effects of damage on safety. Other hazardous materials, such as TIH materials, pose
significant security concerns because of the large number of fatalities or injuries that could
result from their intentional release; however, they would not damage infrastructure.
Flammable liquids, flammable gases, explosives, and TIH materials form a first tier of
hazardous materials to be concerned with from a security perspective when considering
a broad range of targets; however, other materials also pose security risks. Poisonous
materials, such as pesticides, could be used to contaminate water or food supplies.
Oxidizers, such as liquid oxygen, could be used to enhance fires or explosions. Nuclear
materials accumulated for medical shipments could be used in denial-of-service scenarios
for key buildings or locations. Strong corrosive materials could be used to damage
critical infrastructure. Flammable solids could be used to create intense fires. Although
the possibilities are almost endless, there is a general consensus that flammable liquids,
flammable gases, explosives, and TIH materials pose the greatest security concerns
because of shipment quantities, destructive potential, immediate and dramatic impact, and
the history of their use in terrorist incidents and plots, among other factors. Consequently,
this study focuses on these four materials.
The effects of hazardous materials events on transportation infrastructure depend in
large measure on characteristics of the infrastructure itself. For instance, vulnerabilities
of an overpass or bridge to terrorism or sabotage may be magnified if the failure of critical
components can be expected to result in the failure of the entire structure.

Flammable Liquids
The primary hazard posed by flammable liquids is fire, which could be used to damage
infrastructure. The quantity of airline fuel in the tanks of the airplanes that brought down
the World Trade Center on 9/11 was approximately the quantity carried in a large gasoline
tank truck.
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The ability of flammable liquids to damage infrastructure has been demonstrated by a
number of spectacular incidents. For example, in October 1997, a gasoline tank truck
was struck by a passenger car in Yonkers, New York, under an overpass of the New York
State Thruway. The ensuing fire damaged the overpass, and the thruway remained closed
for approximately six months. This incident caused DOT to consider prohibiting wetlines5
under gasoline tank trucks.6
In this and other incidents, the intense heat from hazardous-materials fire caused the
structural steel in an overpass to weaken or melt. Steel begins to lose its strength at
temperatures as low as 800o F and melts at approximately 2,750o F. In addition, concrete
can be damaged by intense heat when water trapped within its structure boils, cracks it,
and breaks it into pieces (a phenomenon known as spalling).
Gasoline fires are complex events. Factors that affect consequences include burning rate,
quantity of fuel available, heat of combustion, heat release rate, access to oxygen, the
size of the gasoline pool, temperature, wind speed, duration of fire, features that confine
or trap heat, and availability of other combustible material. Gasoline tank-truck fires of the
type cited in the above incidents have several features that tend to maximize potential
damage: (1) they are intense fires that persist over an extended period of time, (2) they are
localized, (3) there is good access to oxygen, and (4) heat is trapped below an overhead
structure.

Flammable Gases
The primary hazard posed by a flammable gas is fire. A fireball or vapor-cloud fire releases
thermal energy that can damage infrastructure. It can also ignite other flammable materials
to create an intense fire.
Although a fire is the most likely outcome of a successful attack using a flammable gas,
such as propane, an explosion could also occur under certain circumstances. It is very
difficult to create conditions that would result in an explosion, and such an occurrence
would more likely be due to chance than to an intentional act. A boiling-liquid expandingvolume explosion (BLEVE) is a particularly spectacular hazardous-materials event and
is described below. A fuel-air explosive is a carefully engineered military application of
a vapor-cloud explosion that a terrorist might hope to emulate, as discussed later in this
report, but it is very difficult to improvise. The bottom line is that igniting propane is relatively
easy; causing it to explode at the right time and place is very difficult.
A BLEVE can occur when a liquefied gas is involved in a fire, particularly when flames
impinge on the tank above the liquid level. Tank-shell metal weakens and the vapor
pressure rapidly increases, overwhelming pressure-relief devices. Tank rupture under
these conditions will violently and nearly instantaneously disperse large quantities of
vapor and liquid to the atmosphere. If the liquefied gas is a flammable material and a
source of ignition is present, a massive fire or explosion is possible. BLEVEs were fairly
frequent in rail transportation before thermal protection, head shields, and improved
shelf couplers were added to tank cars. A BLEVE is thought to have occurred in Italy in
the tunnel between Palermo and Punta Raisi airport in 1996 after a tank truck carrying
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)7 was involved in an accident and fire. The time between the
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initial fire and the BLEVE allowed most of the people in the area to escape and limited the
number of fatalities. The tunnel was closed for 2 1/2 days.
Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the differences between flammable liquids and flammable gases.
Table 2 shows the energy content of different liquids and gases. Clearly, gasoline contains
more energy than propane. Table 3 shows the relative capabilities of gasoline and propane
for damaging highway infrastructure and other targets.

Table 2 Selected Hazardous Materials Highway Shipments

Ethanol
Fuel Oil (Number 2)
Gasoline
Propane

Energy Content
(BTUs per gallon)
76,000
139,000
125,000
91,600

Table 3 Comparison of Gasoline and Propane and the Characteristics that
Enable Greater Damage to All Targets
More intense fire based on packaging size and
energy content
Ability to direct heating to a specific area
Capable of longer duration fire
Ease of opening packaging and igniting contents
Ability to ignite other combustible materials at
greater distances (more diffuse effects)
Potential to cause an explosion

Gasoline
X

Propane

X
X
X
X
X

Explosives
The direct hazard posed by explosives is the blast overpressure created by an explosion.
Debris and danger from structural collapse pose additional threats to infrastructure and
people. Table 4 on page 18 provides estimates of damage caused by overpressure.
Highway infrastructure theoretically can be damaged by placing relatively small quantities
of explosives at critical locations. More generalized damage could result from using very
large quantities of bulk explosives in the vicinity of the infrastructure.
The power of explosives is often expressed in terms of TNT equivalency. Relative
effectiveness compares effectiveness relative to TNT by weight only. Table 5 on page 18
provides relative effectiveness values for a number of explosives. Figure 2 shows distances
of concern relative to the effects of overpressure.

Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence

16

Potential Destructive Effects of Hazardous Materials Used in Acts of Terrorism

Table 4 Explosion-Overpressure Damage Estimatesa
Overpressure
(psig)b
0.04
0.15
0.40
0.50–1.0
0.70
1.0
1.0–2.0
1.0–8.0
2.0
2.0–3.0
2.4–12.2
2.5
3.0
5.0
5.0–7.0
7.0
9.0
10.0
14.5–29.0

Expected Damage
Loud Noise (143 Db); Sonic Boom Glass Failure
Typical Glass Failure
Limited Minor Structure Damage
Windows Usually Chattered; Some Window Frame Damage
Minor Damage
Partial Demolition of Houses; Houses Made Uninhabitable
Corrugated Metal Panels Fail and Buckle; Housing Wood Panels
Blown in
Range for Slight to Serious Lacerations From Flying Glass and other
Missiles
Partial Collapse of Walls and Roofs Of Houses
Non-Reinforced Concrete Or Cinderblock Wall Shattered
Range For 1–90 Percent Eardrum Rupture Among Exposed
Populations
50 Percent Destruction of Home Brickwork
Distortion of Steel Frame Building And Pulling Away From
Foundation
Snapping of Wooden Utilities Poles
Nearly Complete Destruction of Houses
Overturning of Loaded Train Boxcars
Demolition of Loaded Train Boxcars
Probably Total Building Destruction
Range For The 1–99 Percent Fatalities Among Exposed Populations
Due to Direct Blast Effects

a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Emergency Management, ALOHA User’s Manual,
Washington DC, February 2007.
b Peak pressures formed in excess of normal atmospheric pressure by blast and shock wages; psig=pounds
per square inch gauge.

Table 5 Relative Effectiveness of Explosives

Material
Black powder
ANFO
TNT
C-4
Nitroglycerin
RDX
PETN
Semtex

Effectiveness
0.55
0.80
1.00
1.34
1.50
1.60
1.66
1.66
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Figure 2 Distances of Concern for Explosive Overpressure
TIH Materials
In contrast to the impact of other hazardous materials considered in this study, the impact
of the deliberate use of TIH materials in an act of terrorism or sabotage would be almost
exclusively on people. Fatalities and injuries are the desired outcome. Casualties can occur
either as a direct result of the materials or due to ensuing panic and crowd behavior (e.g.,
a stampede to an exit). TIH materials carry the specter of chemical warfare and weapons
of mass destruction that may exaggerate their danger; however, the security concern they
have generated is legitimate.
TIH materials may be gases or liquids at normal temperatures. Most TIH gases and vapors
are heavier than air, which contributes to risk when they are released. TIH classification
is based on toxicity for gases and a combination of vapor concentration and toxicity for
liquids. Key terms and definitions applicable to TIH materials are given in Table 6 on page
22. Table 7 on page 23 lists properties of TIH materials that are most often transported by
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highway.
Release of a large quantity of TIH materials in a heavily populated are a feared scenario.
Rapid release of the entire contents of a tank truck carrying TIH materials would minimize
the time to react, evacuate, or shelter the population or to take other protective measures.
Predicting fatalities from an attack involving TIH materials in transportation is exceedingly
difficult. The variables that need to be considered include:
• Amount of release
• Time over which release occurs
• Wind speed and direction
• Temperature
• Daytime or nighttime conditions
• Reaction effects of vegetation, rain, and humidity
• Population present
• Location of population
• Sheltering or evacuation and emergency response that occurs
• Susceptibility of the population to fatalities or injuries.
Models such as ALOHA, HPAC, CASRAM, and commercial models generally calculate
exposure zones or numbers of people exposed to specific concentrations. Translating
these to expected fatalities and injuries presents another level of difficulty. Many of the
larger numbers quoted with regard to TIH materials are potential exposures or casualties.
Moreover, casualties include both fatalities and injuries, which may be minor. The term
casualty often gets translated to fatality in subsequent reporting or use, which exaggerates
estimates of maximum damage.
Figure 3 on page 21 illustrates exposure zones to release of a TIH material. The concentration
of TIH materials moves downwind and decreases over time once the release has ended.
Casualties vary by level and duration of exposure. The contours in Figure 3 can be viewed
as boundary levels between defined concentrations. For instance, the black portion may
be considered LC50 concentrations (defined in Table 6). One would expect many fatalities
among people present for a significant time within this zone. The next contour may show
the boundaries of ERPG-3 exposures (defined in Table 6). Some fatalities and a substantial
number of injuries might be expected in this zone. The risk increases as a person comes
closer to the boundary between LC50 concentrations and ERPG-3 concentrations. It
decreases as the person approaches the ERPG-2 concentration boundary. The lightest
contour represents ERPG-1 concentrations, where only mild, transient health effects might
be expected.
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Figure 3 Exposure Zones to a TIH Material Release (shaded contours illustrate
LC50 and ERPG concentrations as described in the preceding
paragraph)

Modeling done in the National Risk Assessment for Selected Hazardous Materials in
Transportation8 suggests that fatalities from a well-executed and successful attack involving
TIH materials could number in the thousands. The study estimated the number of persons
who would potentially be affected in transportation accidents in ten-year periods over an
extremely long period of time. Single, large events, the probabilities of which are very
low, would be expected to dominate results. While the study suggests that the worst-case
highway accident for the worst TIH material considered (chlorine) could result in many
thousands of deaths, it did not include effects of sheltering (passive or active), which could
reduce the number of fatalities on average by a factor of 7. This suggests that a few
thousand may be the upper limit of fatalities that would occur as the result of a catastrophic
outside release of TIH materials in highway transportation, an estimate that has been
buttressed by more-recent studies.
Achieving this level of fatalities would be difficult. The ability to control a plume and the
unpredictability of results make TIH materials a less-than-ideal choice as a weapon of
mass destruction. A credible attack using truckload quantities of TIH materials in which
everything went as planned (a highly successful attack) could be expected to result in
perhaps as many as a few hundred fatalities; a typical successful attack might produce
dozens of fatalities. Introduction of a TIH material into a building with many people present,
although requiring a greater degree of operational sophistication, is another scenario that
potentially could produce a significant number of fatalities.
The most significant transportation accident involving chlorine occurred near Graniteville,
South Carolina, in January 2002. A rail car carrying approximately 90 tons of chlorine was
breached after an accident caused by a switching error. A substantial proportion of the
chlorine was released from the rail car, resulting in the evacuation of 5,400 people within
one mile of the accident, including the town of Graniteville. Nine people were killed, including
the engineer and a number of employees at the Avondale Mills plant near the accident
location. Given the nature of the accident and the population nearby, more fatalities might
have been expected.
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Table 6 Terms and Definitions Applicable to TIH Materials
Term
TIH
Hazard Zone
Hazard Zone A
Hazard Zone B
Hazard Zone C
Hazard Zone D
ERPGs
ERPG-2

ERPG-3
LC50
V
ERG Protective
Action Distance

Definition
Toxic inhalation hazard, a term used to describe gases and volatile
liquids that are toxic when inhaled. The term is used synonymously
with poison inhalation hazard (PIH).
One of four levels of hazard (A thought D) assigned by hazardous
materials transportation regulations to gases and one of two levels of
hazard (Aand B) assigned to liquids that are toxic when inhaled.
Gases: LC50 less than or equal to 200 ppm. Liquids: V equal to or
greater than 500 LC50, and LC50 less than or equal to 00 ppm.
Gases: LC50 creater than 200 ppm and less than or equal to 1000
ppm. Liquids: V equal to or greater than 10 LC50, and LC50 less
than or equal to 1000 ppm; criteria for Hazard Zone A are not met.
LC50 greater than 1000 ppm and less than or equal to 3000 ppm.
LC50 greater than 3000 ppm and less than or equal to 5000 ppm.
Emergency response planning guidelines, values intended to
provide estimates of concentration ranges above which one could
reasonably anticipate observing adverse health effects.
The maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed
nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without
experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects
or symptoms that could impair an individual’s ability to take protective
action.
The maximum concentration below which it is believed nearly all
individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or
developing live-threatening health effects.
The concentration of a material administered by inhalation that is
expected to cause the death of 50 percent of an experimental animal
population within a specified time.
Saturated vapor concentration in air of a material in mL/m3 (volatility)
at 20°C and standard atmospheric pressure.
Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG) Protective Action Distances
are estimates that have been developed based on historical
transportation incidents. Factors considered include quantities of
materials released, rates at which the materials were released, and
meteorological conditions. Guidebook distances are 90 percent
values based on ERPG-2 distances (i.e., in 90% of the incidents,
distances are less than the ERG value).

Note: ppm=parts per million; mL/m3=millimeters per cubic meter
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Table 7 Properties of Select TIH Materials

a

(in miles,
large spill,a at
night)

Hazard
Zone

LC50
(ppm)

Ammonia, anhydrous
Bromine
Chlorine
Ethylene oxide
Hydrogen chloride
Hydrogen cyanide
Hydrogen fluoride,
anhydrous
Phosgene
Sulfur dioxide

D
A
B
D
C
B

4000
113
293
4350
2810
40

150
0.5
3
50
20
10

750
5
20
500
150
25

-28.03
137.80
-30.23
51.26
-118.66
78.80

1.4
4.6
4.6
1.5
6.5
2.3

C
A
C

1300
5
2520

2.7
7.0+
3.9

B

347

50
1
15
30 mg/
m3

66.92
46.94
14

Sulfuric acid, fuming

20
0.2
3
10 mg/
m3

625

4

Chemical

ERPG-2 ERPG-3
(ppm)
(ppm)

Boiling
Point
(°F)

ERG
Protective
Action
Distance

A large spill could be from a tank truck, a rail car, or a number of smaller packagings.

Conclusions
Flammable liquids, flammable gases, explosives, and TIH materials are all potential terrorist
weapons; they all allow terrorists to meet threshold levels of average consequence, but
with varying likelihood of success. However, explosives and flammable liquids would seem
to be the most likely highway-borne hazmat weapons. Experience with explosives, the
instantaneous nature of associated damage, and the potentially devastating consequences
of an explosion favor their use.
Nevertheless, flammable liquids, particularly gasoline, are widely available in large
quantities in transportation, as discussed in “Commodity Flows” beginning on page 9.
Equally important, they could easily be used against an array of potential soft targets.
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Public Information that could inspire and
inform terrorists
Terrorists and terrorist groups often use public, “open” sources to gain information about
potential targets and weapons. The 9/11 conspirators studied aviation security by examining
public reports of security measures, conducting reconnaissance, and observing security
measures in dry runs.
We explore in later sections the ways terrorists might conduct surveillance. In this section,
we discuss the information terrorists could gain from the open literature about the effects
of the hazardous materials considered in this study.
We believe that three types of data in particular could inspire and instruct terrorist thinking
about the use of hazardous materials: (1) how the materials behave in accidents, including
spectacular, newsworthy events; (2) how the materials are acquired in publicized nonterrorist crimes; and (3) how materials involved in accidents behave in publicly known
disposal operations.

Accident Histories
Information on hazardous materials involved in highway accidents indicates how the
materials behave when they are released in an accident, how many casualties they can
cause, and how much damage they can inflict on highway infrastructure. This information
may be studied by terrorist groups seeking to understand the advantages of weaponizing
different types of hazmat.
Two distinct “sets” of information are available to terrorists: (1) analytical studies and official
data analyses that identify trends and averages, and (2) histories of individual accidents,
especially spectacular accidents that generate publicity.

Analytical Studies and Data Analyses
The most authoritative data on hazardous materials reside in the Hazardous Materials
Information Reporting System (HMIRS) maintained by DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). The National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) also studies high-consequence accidents (or, defined more narrowly for highway
purposes, crashes) and conducts special studies to identify risk trends and problems.
While a large quantity of data is available, we did not find any study focused narrowly on
the consequences for highway infrastructure of fires and explosions caused by gasoline or
propane tankers.
The available data must be carefully understood. For example, the higher casualty
figures for commodities such as gasoline tankers may reflect the relatively large share
of hazardous-materials highway shipments (estimated to be between 35% and 50%,
depending on location, time of day, and time of year) they represent.
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Also, there is no separate category of damage to highway infrastructure. Further, because
carriers filling out reports may wish to understate damages, damage levels are probably
underreported. MTI’s analysis indicated that only ten accidents between 1997 and 2007
resulted in more than $1 million in property damage, and only five of these ten accidents
created property damage of more than $2 million (between $2.5 and $4 million). These
figures are questionable because accidents studied by the NTSB during this period
resulted in high levels of damage. For example, property damage caused by an October
19, 1997, gasoline tanker accident near an overpass on the New York State Thruway
totaled $7 million.
Still, the data tend to suggest that even the classes or divisions of materials that cause
the highest percentages of incidents, fires, property damage, and deaths in highway
transportation accidents generate only modest amounts of damage. According to HMIRS
data, the average amount of property damage would be well under $250,000, which is
certainly modest compared with that created by explosives ($1 million).
However, we have examined the HMIRS data for the ten years between 1997 and 2007,
which contained roughly 50,000 incident reports involving highway transportation, the vast
majority of which took place during loading and offloading and included even small releases.
MTI selected for more in-depth analysis 206 accidents,9 including some that involved more
than one class or division of material, that (1) occurred in transit (as opposed to during
unloading or loading, for example); (2) resulted in a fire, explosion, or gas dispersion; and
(3) caused either one or more deaths, at least $85,000 in damage to the carrier,10 or at
least $100,000 in damage to public property or to private parties other than the carrier.11
Of these 206 accidents, 96% resulted in fires, 33% resulted in explosions, 14% resulted
in gas dispersion, 42% resulted in at least one fatality, and 5% resulted in more than $1
million in damages.
This set of 206 accidents resulted in a total of 105 deaths, $34,487,939 in property damage,
194 fires, 68 explosions, and 28 gas dispersions. The average death per accident was
0.509, and the average property damage per accident was $167,417.
We examined the hazardous materials involved in these 206 accidents and found the five
classes or divisions that were involved in the largest number of accidents. They together
constituted 90% of the accidents, 95% of the deaths, 97% of the property damage, 91%
of the fires, 94% of the explosions, and 86% of the gas dispersions. We also found a
small set of accidents (nine) that involved more than one class or division (and in these,
flammable-combustible liquids were very often involved) and another small set (nine) that
involved other classes or divisions.
The distribution of accidents, deaths, property damage, fires, explosions, and gas
dispersions, along with the average deaths and property damage per incident, are
displayed in the chart below. As the chart reveals, the reported deaths per accident are
low, as is the reported (and probably underreported) property damage.
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Table 8 Summary of 1997–2007 Hazardous Materials Incident
Reporting System (HMIRS) Highway Crash Data: Five Most Lethal
Classes or Divisions

Class
Flammable/
combustible
liquids

Accidents Deaths

170 (83%)

Property
Damage

Fires

94 (90%) $30,861,443 (89%) 161 (83%)

Avg. Average
Gas
Explosions Dispersion Deaths
Loss
60 (88%)

18 (64%)

0.553

$ 181,538

Flammable
Gases

7 (3.4%)

2 (1.9%)

$160,500 (.5%)

7 (3.6%)

0 (0%)

3 (10.7%)

0.286

$ 22,928

Corrosive
materials

6 (2.9%)

2 (1.9%)

$239,000 (.7%)

3 (1.5%)

2 (2.9%)

3 (10.7%)

0.333

$ 39,833

Oxidizers

3 (1.5%)

$105,000 (.3%)

3 (1.5%)

-

-

0.667

$ 35,000

Explosives

2 (.9%)

$2,000,000 (5.8%)

2 (1%)

2 (2.9%)

-

0

$1,000,000

64 (94%)

24 (86%)

0.532

$ 180,123

Total of
5 leading
classes

2 (1.9%)

-

188 (90%) 100 (95%) $33,365,943 (97%) 176 (91%)

Multiple
Classes per
incident

9 (4.4%)

3 (2.9%)

$314,996
(.9%)

9 (4.6%)

2 (2.9%)

2 (7.1%)

0.333

$ 34,999

All other
classes

9 (4.4%)

2 (1.9%)

$807,000 (2.3%)

9 (4.6%)

2 (2.9%)

2 (7.1%)

0.222

$ 89,666

206

105

$34,487,939

194

68

28

0.509

$ 167,417

TOTAL 100%

The data on the five most classes or divisions most frequently involved in these 206 serious
accidents are discussed below:
1. Flammable liquids (the combustible-flammable class), including gasoline, gas oil,
aviation gas, fuel oil, and ethanol, accounted for 83% of the accidents, 90% of the
deaths, 89% of the property damage, 83% of the fires, 88% of the explosions, and
64% of the gas dispersions. There was an average of 0.533 death per incident, and the
average damage amounted to $181,538.
2. Flammable gases, particularly propane, accounted for 3.4% of the accidents, 1.9% of
the deaths, 0.5% of the property damage, 3.6% of the fires, none of the explosions, and
10.7% of the gas dispersions. There was an average of 0.236 death per incident, and
the average damage amounted to $22,928.
3. Corrosive materials, including boron tribromide, amine and polamine liquids, and
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batteries, accounted for 2.9% of the accidents, 1.9% of the deaths, 0.7% of the
property damage, 1.5% of the fires, 2.9% of the explosions, and 10.7% of the gas
dispersions. There was an average of 0.333 death per incident, and the average
damage amounted to $39,833.
4. Oxidizers, such as potassium permanganate, accounted for 1.5% of the
accidents, 1.9% of the deaths, 0.3% of the property damage, 1.5% of the
fires, and none of the explosions and gas dispersions. There was an average
of 0.667 death per incident, and the average damage amounted to $35,000.
5. Explosives, such as detonation fuses and boosters, accounted for 0.9% of the
accidents, none of the deaths, 5.8% of the property damage, 1% of the fires, 2.9%
of the explosions, and none of the gas dispersions. There were no deaths, and the
average damage amounted to $1,000,000.
The 22 accidents of the 206 in these years in which there was either more than one
death or more than $1 million in property damage (only 11% of the total) accounted for
72% of the property damage and 32% of the deaths. Of these 22 serious accidents,
flammable liquids accounted for all but two of the 34 deaths (94%) and $22,724,500 of
the $24,729,50 in property damage (92%).
Several rather simple but important observations could be drawn from these data by
individuals seeking to weaponize flammable liquids, flammable gases, truckload
explosives, or TIH materials.
First, there are no highway incidents involving TIH or chlorine in the database that resulted
From accident data, terrorists might learn that:
1. Flammable liquids create fires that can engulf people and motorists and have the potential of
killing large groups of people if the people are trapped.

2. Flammable gases can create spectacular fireballs and blasts that are intense and deadly and
potentially able to kill large numbers of people, but explosions are difficult to create with
flammable gases.
3. Explosives have huge destructive forces but are stable in the normal transportation
environment.
4. TIH materials such as chlorine can kill large numbers of people, but only if evacuation is
not possible. Also, the safety record of these materials is good. Media and government attention to TIH materials may be more significant for a terrorist than actual accidents are.

in damage to highway infrastructure. There was, in fact, only one incident involving TIH
that caused a fire and property damage above the threshold established for this set of
incidents.12 This may suggest that there are relatively few shipments of these materials
and/or that safety controls and route restrictions are particularly effective.
Second, few accidents were caused by explosives, which may again be the result of
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relatively low levels of transportation, a relatively high level of safety and route controls,
or the relative stability of many explosives unless intentionally discharged. The property
damage per accident, however, is very high—by far the highest of any class.
Third, given the significant trade in propane, the fact that no accidents resulted in an
explosion and only a few resulted in a fire suggests that the structure of the propane tanks
is more robust than that of a gasoline tanker and that it is more difficult to create a fire or
an explosion with propane than might be assumed.
Finally, flammable liquids such as gasoline—which constitute a large percentage of the
hazmat being transported by road—are responsible for the highest percentage of deaths
and property damage. Also, when normalized per incident, gasoline tanker accidents are
roughly twice as lethal as other classes, with the sole exception of oxidizers.
This may lead terrorists to make the following observations: A great deal of flammable
liquid such as gasoline is being transported by road, and crashes involving flammable
liquids often result in fires. The fatality rate is low, especially considering that most of the
casualties are the drivers, but this could simply be a function of where the gasoline is
released.

Studies and Coverage of Spectacular Accidents
Although the average destruction resulting from hazmat accidents is low, some of these
accidents can be spectacular, particularly those involving propane, as indicated by excerpts
from NTSB accident summaries. Some of these are listed below along with our own short
summaries of more-recent accidents that meet the NTSB’s thresholds but have not yet
been formally studied by NTSB and accidents that took place outside the United States
and are therefore outside of NTSB’s jurisdiction. All of the accidents had significant news
coverage, both locally and nationally. Information that would be particularly relevant for
terrorists is italicized.
In these accidents, certain things would be understood by terrorists:
1. The fires created by flammable liquids can engulf motorists, bystanders, and residences
at some distance from the actual release. The potential to cause large numbers of
casualties is clear.
2. The fireball and blast created by flammable gas can be intense and deadly. The strength
of the blast is determined by the size of the explosion and the distance that pieces of
the vehicle travel after the explosion. Once again, the potential to cause large numbers
of casualties is clear.
3. Explosives have significant force but are, in fact, stable.
4. TIH materials can, if directed properly, cause a significant number of deaths. (Far more
information is available from rail tank car accidents than from highway accidents.)
However, if the population at risk is alerted, evacuation is possible and major casualties
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can be avoided.

Accidents Involving Flammable Liquids
June 6, 2008: Atlanta, Georgia. A tanker truck accident closed I-85 near Atlanta. The fuel
spilled, but there was no fire.
June 4, 2008: Tampa, Florida. A tanker on fire shut down traffic in both directions on I-75
and 301 near Tampa. The fire caused significant damage to an overpass, which will be
closed for weeks.
January 18, 2008: Providence, Rhode Island. A tanker truck exploded, showering
surrounding buildings and houses with debris.
July 27, 2007: Register-Guard, Oregon. A gasoline tanker (a tractor towing two tanker
trailers) exploded after catching fire. The cargo was 10,000 gallons of gasoline. Both tanks
exploded. There were no injuries. Highway 58 was closed for six hours.
August 9, 1998: Biloxi, Mississippi. At about 12:53 a.m., a Premium Tank Lines, Inc.,
truck driver was transferring gasoline from a cargo tank to underground storage tanks at a
Fast Lane gasoline station-convenience store in Biloxi, Mississippi, when an underground
storage tank containing gasoline overflowed. An estimated 550 gallons of gasoline
flowed from the storage tank, across the station lot into the adjacent highway, through an
intersection, and into a storm drain. The gasoline ignited, and fire engulfed three vehicles
near the intersection, which ultimately resulted in the deaths of five occupants and the
serious injury of one. Damages were estimated at $55,000.13
October 9, 1997: Yonkers, New York. At about 12:10 a.m., a truck tractor pulling a cargo
tank semi trailer was going under an overpass of the New York State Thruway when it
was struck by a sedan. The car hit the right side of the cargo tank in the area of the tank’s
external loading/unloading lines, releasing the gasoline they contained. The ensuing fire
destroyed both vehicles and the overpass; the thruway remained closed for approximately
6 months. The driver of the car was killed; the driver of the truck was not injured. Property
damage was estimated at $7 million.14
March 17, 1993: Fort Lauderdale, Florida. About 3:13 p.m. on a Wednesday, an Amerada
Hess (Hess) tractor-semi trailer hauling gasoline was struck by National Railroad Passenger
Corporation (Amtrak) train 91. The truck driver was attempting to cross a railroad/highway
grade crossing on Cypress Creek Road in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Traffic in the area of
the crossing was congested because the left and center lanes were closed just over the
crossing. Traffic was being channeled into the right lane and later shifted into a right-turn
lane. The truck, which was loaded with 8,500 gallons of gasoline, was punctured when it
was struck. A fire erupted, engulfing the truck and nine other vehicles. The fire killed the
truck driver and five occupants of three stopped vehicles.15
February 13, 1991: Carmichael, California. About 3 a.m. Pacific Standard Time, a
tractor-semi trailer (cargo tank) overturned as the vehicle was traveling on a main urban
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roadway in Carmichael, California.... At the time of the accident, the truck was being used
for the intrastate delivery of gasoline to service stations; the cargo tank contained about
8,800 gallons of automotive gasoline. The driver lost control of the vehicle in a curve. The
vehicle overturned onto its side and struck the embankment of a drainage ditch located in
a dirt field beside the road. The cargo tank bounced and came to rest in the dirt field and
adjacent to the drainage ditch. The rear end of the cargo tank landed on an unoccupied
car parked in the field. Gasoline from the cargo tank spilled into the drainage ditch, which
extended under the roadway and behind private residences nearby. About 15 minutes after
the overturn, the gasoline ignited behind a residence. The fire flashed back and engulfed
the overturned cargo tank, and the car under the cargo tank. A second unoccupied car
parked near the overturned tank truck also caught fire. Gasoline runoff in the drainage ditch
entered the underground drainage system and was also ignited. In addition to the total loss
of the tank truck, its cargo, and the two parked cars, four homes and their contents were
destroyed or heavily damaged by fire, and the residents from a 2-mile-square area were
evacuated.16
December 4, 1975: Seattle, Washington. About 1 a.m., a 1975 Peterbilt tank truck and
a 1970 Peerless full trailer (tank), owned by Union Oil Company of California, went out
of control on the Alaskan Way Viaduct in Seattle, Washington, as the driver attempted
to negotiate a curve on the traffic-polished concrete roadway at 52 mph and during a
rainstorm. The combination vehicle jackknifed and the trailer struck a viaduct support
column. The trailer’s tank ruptured and its cargo of gasoline spilled. Fire ensued, spread
along the viaduct, and spilled to the ground below, where it ignited 4 railroad freight cars, 30
motor vehicles, and adjacent buildings. The accident caused property damage estimated
at $750,000. Two firemen were injured while fighting the fire.17

Accidents Involving Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Including but Not Limited to
Propane)
July 11, 2008: Tarragona, Spain. A large LPG truck exploded close to a campsite near
Tarragona. The campsite was crowded with campers in tents and trailers at the time. The
blast and fireball left a 5-foot deep, 65-foot wide crater and destruction within a 1,000-foot
radius. More than 200 people were killed. The exact events surrounding the accident are
subject to debate. The tank truck was not equipped with emergency pressure-relief devices
and may have been overloaded and subject to thermal expansion from the sunshine, may
have been in a vehicle crash, or may have been engulfed in fire, subsequently causing a
BLEVE.
July 27, 1994: White Plains, New York. About 12:30 a.m., a tractor cargo-tank semi
trailer loaded with 9,200 gallons of propane (a liquefied petroleum gas) and operated by
Suburban Paraco Corporation was traveling east on Interstate 287 in White Plains, New
York. The truck drifted across the left lane onto the left shoulder and struck the guardrail;
the tank hit a column of the Grant Avenue overpass. The tractor and the semi trailer
separated, and the front head of the tank fractured, releasing the propane, which vaporized
into gas. The resulting vapor cloud expanded until it found a source of ignition. When it
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ignited, according to an eyewitness, a fireball rose 200 or 300 feet in the air. The tank was
propelled northward about 300 feet and landed on a frame house, engulfing it in flames.
The driver was killed, 23 people were injured, and an area with a radius of approximately
400 feet was engulfed by fire.18
April 29, 1975: Eagle Pass, Texas. At 4:20 p.m., a Surtigas, S.A., tractor-tank-semi trailer,
westbound on U.S. Route 277 near Eagle Pass, Texas, swerved to avoid an automobile
ahead which was slowing for a turn. The tank-semi trailer separated from the tractor,
struck a concrete headwall, and ruptured; vaporized LPG was released. The ensuing
fire and explosion destroyed a building and 51 vehicles. The 51 persons who were in the
area were burned and 16 persons, including the truck driver, were killed. The National
Transportation Safety Board determined the cause of the fatalities and injuries to persons
in the vicinity was the explosive force and fire, from which they had no time to escape.
The rapid development of the explosive force and fire was caused by the gross rupture of
the tank.19
September 21, 1972: New Jersey Turnpike. At 8:25 p.m., a tractor-semi trailer (tank)
carrying propylene liquid petroleum gas sideswiped a Greyhound bus (carrying no
passengers) in the southbound lanes of the New Jersey Turnpike about one mile north of
Exit 8. After impact, the bus, while rotating clockwise and sliding across the highway, was
struck by a southbound automobile. The tractor-semi trailer scraped, then straddled the
turnpike’s median guardrail, jackknifed, spun into the northbound lanes, and overturned.
Before overturning, the tractor-semi trailer was struck by a northbound automobile. Fire,
which had erupted at the tractor as it scraped the median guardrail, spread to propylene
which was leaking from the cargo tank’s damaged plumbing. After the fire had burned for
about 25 minutes, the cargo tank exploded in a ball of flame; segments of the tank rocketed
more than 1,300 feet northeast and 500 feet southwest of the tractor-semi trailer.20
March 9, 1972: Lynchburg, Virginia. At 2:30 p.m., a tractor-semi trailer (tank) carrying
liquid propane under pressure was traveling north on U.S. Route 501 at approximately
25 m.p.h. At a point 7.1 miles north of Lynchburg, Va., the truck…slid along the shoulder
on its right side and struck a rock outcropping, which ruptured the tank and permitted the
liquid propane to escape. On exposure to the atmosphere, the propane vaporized into a
cloud, which spread rapidly throughout the area. Within 1 or 2 minutes a fire erupted in
the propane-air mixture. The truck driver, apparently not injured in the rollover, fled on foot
north from the overturned vehicle. When the propane-air mixture ignited, the truck driver
was enveloped in the fire and was killed. Two southbound motorists, who had stopped
their cars north of the overturned truck, and a passenger of one of the motorists were
severely burned when the vapor cloud ignited. The occupants of a house located in a
hollow below and west of the highway heard the crash and ran from the house, but were
caught in the propane-air vapor flash and were severely burned. One of these victims died
as a result of his burns. The house, outbuildings, and about 12 acres of woodland were
destroyed in the ensuing fire.21

Accidents Involving Explosives
June 4, 1971: Waco, Georgia. At about 8:00 p.m., a 1961 Volkswagen two-door sedan,
traveling west on U. S. Highway 78 (Old Georgia Route 8), crossed over the centerline of
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the two-lane highway and collided head on with an eastbound tractor semitrailer transporting
a 25,414-pound cargo of explosives. Both vehicles were traveling at about 40 mph before
impact. Fire broke out immediately along the left side of the tractor and in front of the
trailer. Firemen arrived at the scene shortly thereafter and tried to put out the fire while the
truck driver tried to persuade bystanders to move from the burning wreckage. The cargo
detonated about 10 or 15 minutes after the collision. The automobile driver apparently was
fatally injured in the collision. The truck driver was not injured. Both drivers were alone in
their vehicles. Two firemen, a wrecker driver, and two bystanders died as a result of the
explosion. Thirty-three people were injured and property damage was estimated in excess
of one million dollars…the cause of the explosion was localized heat on the nitroglycerinbased dynamite. The explosion caused extensive property damage.

Accidents Involving TIH Materials
August 22, 2003: Middletown, Ohio. At 7:17 a.m., an Amerigas Corporation (Amerigas)
cargo tank semi trailer arrived at the AK Steel Corporation (AK Steel) facility in Middletown,
Ohio. The driver pulled the vehicle up to the fill location and helped an AK Steel employee
hook up to the fittings for a plant storage tank. According to the driver, about 7:40 a.m., the
AK Steel employee began transferring anhydrous ammonia, a poisonous and corrosive
gas, from the storage tank to the cargo tank. The driver said that it took about 30 minutes
to equalize the pressure between the storage tank and the cargo tank. He said that once
the pressure was equalized, the internal pressure in the cargo tank was 130 pounds per
square inch gauge (psig). About 8:20 a.m., while the cargo tank was still being loaded, its
front head cracked open, releasing vapor. The driver, who had been resting in the tractor,
got out and saw the escaping vapor. He said that he activated the emergency shut off
device for the cargo tank and that according to the gauges, the cargo tank was a little
less than half full, the internal pressure was about 170 psig, and the temperature of the
anhydrous ammonia was 80 degrees F. About 100 employees and contract workers were
evacuated from the buildings downwind of the cargo tank and moved to safer locations.
Five people were treated for inhalation injuries and released. The cost of repairing and
replacing damaged equipment was about $25,000.
May 11, 1976: Houston, Texas. About 11:08 a.m., a Transport Company of Texas tractorsemi trailer (tank) transporting 7,509 gallons of anhydrous ammonia struck and penetrated
a bridge rail on a ramp connecting I-610 with the Southwest Freeway (U.S. 59) in Houston,
Texas. The tractor and trailer left the ramp, struck a support column of an overpass, and
fell onto the Southwest Freeway, approximately 15 feet below. The anhydrous ammonia
was released from the damaged tank semi trailer. Six persons died as a result of the
accident, 78 persons were hospitalized, and approximately 100 other persons were treated
for injuries.... The cause of 5 of the 6 fatalities and all of the 178 injuries was the inhalation
of anhydrous ammonia. 23

Criminal Thefts of Fuel and Fuel Tankers
Terrorists are opportunists; they maximize gain and minimize risk. Therefore, they look
for easy, proven ways to increase the chances of obtaining materials and reaching their
objectives. Purely criminal operations can inspire and instruct terrorist attacks on both
counts. Airline hijackings gained prominence as a criminal activity, and ransom kidnappings
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were purely criminal operations. Both tactics were subsequently adopted by terrorists.
Publicized accounts of criminal activity assist a terrorist operation in several ways. First,
for terrorists considering attacks using hazardous materials, they illustrate methods of
purchasing or obtaining the materials, or obtaining a hazmat cargo vehicle itself. Second,
accounts of criminal activity may illustrate ways of delivering a weapon to the target. By
observing news accounts or perhaps connecting with or recruiting criminals, a terrorist
operative can become familiar with the ways others surreptitiously achieve an end that is
similar to theirs and can then make adjustments to fit the technique to their objectives.
In January 2008 alone, multiple thefts of tankers occurred. In examining these and other
attacks, several observations arise:
1. The theft of fuel oil appears to be a significant crime, requiring some level of organization.
In other words, it is the act not of a single criminal, but of a conspiracy—probably an
informal, local one. This suggests that terrorists who seek knowledge of how fuel can
be stolen can obtain it.
2. The theft of fuel appears to be related to fuel costs, if fuel prices increase, criminal thefts
will also increase. Thus, the motivation for and sophistication of the thefts will increase,
and so will the knowledge of successful techniques. Most of the thefts have occurred
where fuel oil is needed and transported the most: on the mid-Atlantic seaboard and
in the Northeast, areas that account for nearly 80% of the fuel oil used in the United
States.24
3. The fact that many thefts of tankers take place at night and from unguarded sites, some
of them by hot-wiring or using keys left in the trucks, suggests that security measures
could be strengthened with relatively little effort.
4. Some of the thefts are simple hijackings at gunpoint with the driver in the rig, or thefts
of vehicles left unattended at a truck stop. Site visits performed by the authors of this
report confirmed that there is a concern about common crime, including theft and nonterrorist employee sabotage, and a general sense that the chances of hijacking are
likely to grow when the price of fuel increases.
5. Smaller companies appear to experience more thefts, although whether the loss per
shipment is greater than that incurred by large companies cannot be determined with
current data. It may also be that security measures used by smaller companies are
more easily circumvented, but this is subject to verification.
6. The relatively few incidents in which the truck rig is damaged suggest that thieves and
hijackers are familiar with trucks and that they have at least minimal driving skills, as
well as basic insider knowledge of the trade. Site visits confirm that while a complete
novice might have difficulty driving a stolen tanker truck, the level of sophistication
needed to drive a rig and discharge the fuel is hardly insurmountable and could be
achieved in a few days; some newer tractors have automatic transmissions, which
makes them easier to drive.
7. There are indications of insider collusion. Such collusion could be unwittingly provided
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to a terrorist operation by a person who believes he is involved only in a criminal theft.
In harder economic times, the incentive for employees to engage in what they perceive
to be a “black market” will increase.
8. The fact that a storage or hiding area for the stolen fuel is often already arranged
suggests that fuel could be stolen and later placed into either an underground facility, a
fuel tanker, or a surrogate tanker for use in a terrorist operation.
9. Law enforcement response to hijackings is a challenge.

Hazmat Disposal Operations
The transportation of hazardous materials by rail and highway often creates a need for
special disposal operations. These operations, which involve releasing, burning, or
containing the material, can provide inspiration and information on how certain materials
behave and what is needed to release and ignite them for maximum effect. Some of the
information is publicly available and easily accessible by terrorists.
Disposal operations for flammable liquids focus on cleanup and containment. Liquid
flammables are generally released and ignited quickly. If they are not, the disposal operation
involves transferring the liquid from a damaged container to another container. When liquid
flammables do burn, the fire lasts less than 10 minutes and is extremely intense, generating
heat of more than 2,000°F.
TIH materials dissipate quickly if the containing structure is compromised. Casualties
downwind and downhill from a release, under the right conditions, could be significant. But
once TIH material is vented, there is little to do other than wait for it to dissipate through
normal pressure and wind. Terrorists would learn little from disposal operations other
than reconfirmation of the toxicity of the material if it can be directed to a concentrated
population.
Explosives experts face situations in which truckload explosives have either detonated
through an accident and caused a blast or have to be isolated and removed from sources
of further detonation. Explosive materials may remain stable despite an accident, thus
emphasizing the need for detonation. It should be pointed out that when explosive that is
contained and intact is exposed to fire, significant explosions can result. The most recent
accident involving highway transportation of high explosives occurred in Spanish Fork, Utah,
on August 10, 2005. The truck carrying the explosives caught fire, and the cargo—35,500
pounds of cast boosters (Penolite)—detonated, creating a crater three stories deep.
Finally, disposal operations for flammable gases, in which carefully managed explosives
are often used, provide valuable information on how destructive flammable gases can
be, but also information on how difficult it can be to unleash that force. For terrorists,
the destructive force would be known from information on rail accidents, which are more
spectacular, as will be seen.
A procedure referred to as “vent and burn” has been used successfully more than 15
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times in the past 20 years to dispose of flammable gases and liquids. It is an emergency
technique that is used as a last resort to mitigate the danger from containers—such as tank
cars—involved in an accident. In these situations, the tank car usually has considerable
damage and cannot be moved or offloaded.
The charges used in a vent-and-burn operation are designed to puncture small holes in the
tank car in a careful sequence of events, in which the tank is opened, then the material is
released and safely ignited and burned. When this is successful, a rail tank car of propane
will burn out quickly in cold weather. Vent and burn techniques have been improved over
the years.
The explosive force of the material itself has been seen in unsuccessful operations of this
kind. After a derailment in Molina, Florida, in 1979, the disposal operation was unsuccessful
and three rail cars detonated and were blown more than a mile away. In a February 2003
accident in Lonsdale, Ontario, Canada, five LPG tank cars were involved in a derailment,
and three of them experienced a BLEVE. While vent-and-burn operations were successful
on two of the three tank cars, the third operation was not successful and that tank car was
found a mile from the derailment site.
As indicated, the key technical challenge is that of releasing, venting, and then igniting the
material, especially at a time and place chosen by the terrorist. The timing and the amount
and shape of explosive needed to create an explosion—and even more so, vented burns—
are critical and difficult to achieve. If these efforts were directed at creating a large fuel-air
explosion in a populated area, the fatalities from blast, heat, and damage from rocketing
pieces of the tanker could be considerable. But there are many technical problems that
must be overcome with considerable sophistication. This is not therefore considered as
significant a threat as others.

Conclusion
Terrorists reviewing publicly available material would draw several conclusions. From
accident data and spectacular accidents, they would see that (a) flammable liquids create
tremendous fires; (b) flammable gases can create spectacular fireballs and blasts, but timed
explosions are difficult to achieve; (c) explosives have huge destructive force but are stable
in the normal transportation environment; and (d) TIH materials such as chlorine—despite
alarmist media attention—can kill large numbers of people only if effective emergency
response is not possible. They could also gain inspiration from thefts of tankers, and
from public knowledge about hazardous materials disposal operations, understand both
the explosive force of detonating flammable gases and also the difficulty of creating and
directing such an explosion.
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Current state of security regulation and
recommended practices
This section examines security regulations and recommendations for highway
transportation of hazardous materials from the standpoint of the issuing authority, i.e., the
federal government, and industry associations. It then summarizes all of these regulations
and recommendations by the phase of security they cover: personnel, terminal, and en
route. Finally, it assesses the general adequacy of regulations as recommended and as
implemented. It does not treat state authorities however, which are significant players in
the regulatory framework

Background and Framework of Federal Regulation and Inspection
Regulatory responsibility for the security of highway transportation is currently shared
by TSA, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), and PHMSA. In the
period following 9/11, TSA was new and was concerned primarily with standing up a large
federal workforce for aviation security. As the agencies responsible for the regulation of
trucking and hazardous materials, FMCSA and PHMSA issued security rules until TSA
was appropriately organized and staffed to take on this function, after which any security
countermeasures issued in response to threat conditions would be issued by TSA. In
2006, TSA and PHMSA executed a formal memorandum of understanding that delineates
their agencies’ respective authorities and commits those agencies to coordinating their
programs and activities in advance under multiyear action plans.
Inspection and enforcement is also divided between FMCSA and TSA. FMCSA has
identified approximately 38,000 carriers of hazardous materials of the types and quantities
that could be used as weapons. Nearly all have been contacted regarding a security
sensitivity visit. FMCSA conducts about 3,000 compliance reviews of hazardous materials
carriers annually. A more in-depth program to visit carriers transporting certain explosives,
radioactive materials, and highly toxic substances is under way. TSA had a workforce of
100 surface-transportation security inspectors in FY 2007 and plans to increase the number
to 200 by FY 2010. However, those inspectors are primarily responsible for rail and public
transit rather than the security of highway transportation of hazardous materials.
Current security regulations focus on security threat assessments (STAs) for drivers who
have a hazardous-material endorsement to their commercial driver’s license; operating rules
for transporting hazardous materials; security plans for companies transporting hazardous
materials; and safety permits required for carriers of certain hazardous materials.

Federal Security Regulations
Security Threat Assessments to Prevent Insider Incidents
Title 49 CFR 1572.3 identifies drivers who hold a commercial driver’s license under 49
CFR 383 and 384 and are applying to obtain, renew, or transfer a hazardous-materials
endorsement (HME) to that license. These drivers are subject to an STA conducted in
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accordance with the standards in CFR 1572.5. Those standards include disqualifying
criminal offenses described in CFR 1572.103, immigration status requirements described
in CFR 1572.105, an analysis described in CFR 1572.107 that determines that an applicant
is a security threat, and a finding of mental incapacity under CFR 1572.109. The detailed
information the applicant must provide is prescribed in CFR 1572.9. Applicants must
provide fingerprints for an FBI/CJIS (Criminal Justice Information Services) criminal-history
records check. TSA conducts the STA through its Transportation Threat and Credentialing
Office. The finding that an applicant is a security risk is based on an “intelligence-related
background check.” No state may issue or renew an HME without a TSA determination
of no security threat and a state must revoke the HME if notified that the individual is a
security threat.

Federal Operating Rules for General Security Purposes
Title 49 CFR Part 397 contains the rules for driving and parking when transporting
hazardous materials. Regulations intended for safety purposes may also be significant
security countermeasures.
Section 397.5 requires that vehicles carrying Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 explosives must
be attended at all times by the driver or a qualified representative of the motor carrier. A
vehicle is attended when that person is on it or is within 100 feet and has an unobstructed
view of it. Vehicles carrying explosives are not required to be attended when they are in
a government-approved safe haven. Vehicles containing other hazardous materials must
also be attended unless the driver is “performing duties that are incident and necessary to
[his] duties as the operator.” A vehicle carrying Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 explosives may not
be parked within 300 feet of a bridge, tunnel, or place where people congregate, unless
there is no practicable alternative. Drivers of such vehicles must also be provided with the
names and phone numbers of persons to be contacted in an emergency.
States must follow CFR 397.61 et seq when establishing and maintaining routing
designations for nonradioactive hazardous material in quantities that require placarding.
Routing designations must be provided to the public under CFR 397.73.
Public Law 110-53, the 9/11 Commission Act, provides that the Secretary of Transportation,
in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall document, assess, and
analyze routes for transporting radioactive and nonradioactive hazardous materials and
shall identify criteria for selecting routes based upon safety and security concerns within
one year.
There is also a general provision in CFR 397.67 stating that even if no state routing
designations apply, vehicles transporting hazardous materials should not be operated
over routes that go through or near heavily populated areas, tunnels, etc., unless there
is no practicable alternative or the driver is required to detour. The driver must be given a
written route plan if the vehicle is transporting Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 explosives.

FMCSA Safety Permits
FMCSA requires that motor carriers file a Motor Carrier Identification Report and HM
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Permit Application (Form MCS-150B) per CFR 390.19 to transport either 25 kg (55 lb.) of
Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 explosives, PIH materials (the quantity varies by hazard zone), or
compressed or liquefied methane or natural gas in containers larger than 3,500 gallons.
The motor carrier must certify, among other things, that it has:
• A satisfactory security plan per Part 172 of CFR49, cited above
• A communications plan meeting the periodic contact requirements of Section 		
385.415
• Successful completion of the security training required by Section 172.804.
The information required on Form MCS-150B includes a detailed identification of hazardous
materials carried and the number of vehicles (specifically, hazmat cargo tank trucks and
trailers) used for this purpose.
The operational requirements for a hazardous materials permit under Section 385.415
include a requirement that the motor carrier provide a telephone number to be carried on
the vehicle that can be used to verify by a motor-carrier employee or representative that
the shipment “is within the general area for the expected route for the permitted material.”

PHMSA Security Plan Requirement
Title 49 CFR 172.800 requires that any person transporting more than 25 kg (55 pounds)
of a Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 explosive or 3,500 gallons or more of bulk hazardous materials
must have a security plan.
Title 49 CFR 172.802 states that the security plan must include an assessment of security
risks and appropriate measures to address those risks. At a minimum, the plan must
contain:
• Measures to confirm information provided by applicants hired for positions 		
involving access to and handling of hazardous material
• Measures to address the assessed risk of unauthorized access to hazardous 		
materials or conveyances
• Measures to address assessed security risks en route from origin to destination.
Title 49 CFR 172.704 (commonly referred to as the HM-232 Security Awareness Program)
requires that each employee with access to hazmat “receive training that provides
an awareness of security risks associated with hazardous-materials transportation
and methods designed to enhance transportation security. The training must include a
component covering how to recognize and respond to possible security threats.”

Federal Recommended Security Measures for Security Plans
PHMSA and TSA Guidelines
PHMSA has issued regulations and guidelines for developing and implementing security
plans. On June 26, 2008, TSA issued extensive guidance to implement the PHMSA
regulations. The measures are indexed to DHS security threat conditions green, blue,
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yellow, orange, and red, indicating the prevailing threat assessment. TSA, the lead federal
agency for hazmat security issues, has also instituted a program of corporate security
reviews (CSRs) (see below for further discussion).25
A training program designed to provide the necessary knowledge and tools to conduct
an effective security assessment of a motor carrier’s operations was developed as a
cooperative effort by PHMSA, FMCSA, and TSA. The centerpiece of the program, called
Hazmat Motor Carrier Security Self Assessment Training, is the “Guide for Developing an
Effective Security Plan for the Highway Transportation of Hazardous Materials” developed
by Battelle and TotalSecurity.US for FMCSA. The guide is designed to provide motor carriers
with sufficient background to understand the threats involving hazardous materials, the
means to identify the vulnerabilities to those threats, and an approach to addressing those
vulnerabilities. The guide includes the vulnerability assessment, the components to be
included in a security plan, the components of a training program, and the administration
of a security plan.
TSA has also developed the “Hazmat Motor Carrier Security Self-Assessment” for
managers and another version for drivers. These guides have a question-and-answer
format, with questions such as: “Do you verify that your drivers meet all state and federal
commercial drivers licensing requirements, including verifying that they are authorized
to handle and transport hazardous materials?” A “yes” answer is followed by security
reminders; a “no” answer is followed by a complete checklist of security actions needed
to meet all applicable requirements. A contact list of all concerned federal agencies is
appended.
According to two TSA reports,26 TSA also conducts CSRs in various modes of
transportation, including highway infrastructure and freight motor carriers. In 2004, TSA
began management interviews and site visits to assess security policies and practices of
organizations that operate critical highway infrastructure such as large bridges and long
tunnels. By 2006, TSA reported that it had completed CSRs for 38 state governments and
four other operational authorities.
Similarly, TSA targeted motor carriers that transport hazardous materials for CSRs. By the
end of 2006 (the most recently available report), TSA had completed 15 CSRs at motor
carriers. At that time, TSA did not believe that the “small amount of data gathered lends
itself to rigorous statistical analysis.”
The CSRs used a framework of 73 standard questions to interview infrastructure operators
and a modified framework of 76 questions for motor carriers. The questions covered ten
functional areas:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Threat assessment
Vulnerability assessment
Critical infrastructure
Management and oversight
Personnel security
Training
Secure areas
Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence

Current State of Security Regulation and Recommended Practices

39

8. Physical security countermeasures
9. Cyber security
10. Exercises
The results of the CSRs are considered Security Sensitive Information and are restricted
on a need-to-know basis. In published reports, TSA uses numerical scores that are not
“an absolute measure of how well an organization has implemented security practices” for
comparative purposes.
TSA conducted a pilot program in Missouri that trained 40 state investigators to perform
CSRs in partnership with FMCSA. TSA is now training compliance inspectors and safety
auditors in Michigan and Colorado, as well as its own Transportation Security Inspectors
to perform CSRs.
TSA works with the DHS Infrastructure Protection (IP) office, which is charged with
coordinating with state and local governments and implementing grant and training
programs to protect all types of infrastructure. TSA experts have accompanied IP contractors
on site assist visits to bridges and tunnels. IP’s protective security advisors have in turn
participated in CSRs.

Industry Recommended Security Measures
American Chemistry Council Motor Carrier Security Guidance
The American Chemistry Council Guide was “solely intended to stimulate thinking,” but it
is more detailed and specific in its recommendations than any other guidance produced
for similar purposes. It contains guidance not only for carriers of hazardous materials, but
also for shippers, to provide complete supply-chain security. It is therefore considered to
be an exemplar of such industry guidance. The guide was published in 2003 and has been
superseded by new regulatory requirements in some areas, particularly in driver surety.

Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME) Guidelines
The recommendations in IME Safety Library Publication 14, Handbook for the Transportation
and Distribution of Explosives Materials, updated in 2007, do not go beyond federal
regulatory requirements with respect to any practice that could be considered a security
countermeasure.

Highway Watch and Successor Programs
The Highway Watch program had four major components:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Training and outreach
A 24/7 call center
The Highway Watch Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC)
The Emergency Warning and Education Center (EWEC)

The Highway Watch program conducted security-awareness training for highway
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professionals such as truck drivers and infrastructure construction, maintenance, and
operations personnel. The training provided instruction in how to recognize potential
security threats, to avoid becoming the target of terrorists, and to accurately and rapidly
report concerns to the authorities. Training was presented in English and Spanish, both in
person and electronically. About 800,000 persons have received the training.
The Highway Watch program was replaced by the Trucking Security Program known as
“Eyes on the Road.” Subsequently, in September 2008, it evolved to another program
known as “First Observer.”27
ISAC shares and analyzes information collected from its members and works collaboratively
with law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and transportation-industry leaders to
validate and verify the information and to identify trends, patterns, and potential threats.
It disseminates its findings to the surface transportation industry and law enforcement.
TSA has also produced a series of foldout brochures on reporting suspicious activities
and threat indicators.

Summary of Required and Recommended Security Measures
Security Measures for Vetting Personnel
Drivers must have a valid commercial driver’s license with an HME based upon an STA.
Other measures to vet personnel are an employment background check; verification of
citizenship or immigration status, perhaps with a social security number; and criminal
background checks for employees other than drivers through a private security
company. 		

Security Measures for Access Control
Facilities should be fenced, with locked gates and doors. Parked vehicles should be locked
when unattended. Lighting and clear zones around fences and buildings may be combined
with CCTV, alarm systems, or security guards to spot intruders. A photo ID system should
also be used to determine if persons are authorized to be in the area.

En Route Security Measures
Each driver’s identity and shipment information should be confirmed before departure.
Access to information about shipments should be limited to essential personnel. Vehicles
should be attended in transit, and those transporting explosives or TIH in many states must
follow designated routes and use designated safe stopping and parking places. These
routes and stopping or parking places are public information, which may also present
vulnerability (discussed later). Vehicles should be inspected for tampering with locks
or seals applied to valves and cargo doors. A co-driver or escort can provide additional
security. Communications must be maintained with the driver and an alert notification
must be made if a shipment does not arrive when and where expected. Drivers may be
provided with a panic-button type of alarm for use in emergency situations. A vehicle
tracking system is also recommended.
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Vehicle tracking and disabling systems are discussed in MTI publication 09-04 and are
briefly referenced again in the “Analysis of the Threat” section of this report. In short, vehicle
tracking is required for DOD explosives shipments and is recommended—and probably
increasingly implemented—for commercial TIH and truckload explosives shipments by
TSA specifically (in its Security Action Items) and also by PHMSA generally. Technologies
that enable local or remote immobilization of vehicles are being implemented for high-value
shipments (such as cigarettes), and while neither DOD nor TSA pilot programs include
immobilization for TIH and explosives shipments, they may do so in the future.
The situation is significantly different for gasoline and propane tankers. While vehicle
tracking and some panic alarms have been implemented for economic reason in large
tanker fleets, they are not used by smaller carriers and are unlikely to be implemented
soon. More important, there are no indications that the industry is going to implement either
Current Security Measures in Brief
Personnel vetting
• TSA fingerprint-based security threat assessment for hazmat drivers
• Employment background check, verification of citizenship or immigration status
• Possible criminal background checks
Access control
• Fenced facilities
• Locked gates, doors, and unattended parked vehicles
• CCTV, alarm systems, or security guards
• Photo ID system for authorized personnel
En Route Security
• Confirm driver’s identity and shipment information
• Attend vehicles in transit
• Maintain communications with driver
• Alert law enforcement if driver gives an alarm or shipment doesn’t arrive
• Panic button or vehicle tracking system, especially for explosives or TIH shipments
local or remote immobilization voluntarily, nor are there any federal mandates to do so.
FMCSA, which as been at the forefront of piloting technologies, has recognized the dualuse benefits of these technologies for improving operational efficiency as well as improving
security and reducing cargo theft if they are implemented by motor carriers, including
gasoline and propane carriers. PHMSA has also issued general recommendations for
tracking. However, TSA’s recommendations for tracking and immobilization do not apply to
carriers of flammable liquids and gases.

Evaluation of Security Measures
The MTI team applied its regulatory and analytical experience and the results of two May
2008 site visits in evaluating the adequacy of the general framework of security measures
and some specific security countermeasures. The evaluation of security countermeasures
to be implemented is based on their estimated effectiveness, which varies with two key
factors: (1) the assumptions made regarding the capabilities of an attacker and the plausible
attack scenarios, and (2) an estimate of the probable level of compliance and diligence in
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implementing the countermeasures.
The assumptions made regarding the capabilities of an attacker and the plausible attack
scenarios are outlined in the chapter titled “Analysis of the Threat and Potential Attacks”
beginning on page 47. The operational planning involved for these scenarios is highly
influenced by the presence or absence of insiders who can provide information or actually
operate a tank truck. The probable level of compliance and diligence in implementing the
countermeasures is important, because countermeasures that are deemed effective but
not actually carried out only create a false sense of security.
Countermeasures are needed for each phase of an attempted attack. Those phases
and our preliminary evaluation regarding propane and gasoline tankers (where site visits
helped us) and explosives and TIH carriers are as follows:
1. Gathering information and selecting a target. The large numbers of flammable
liquid and gas vehicles and facilities make gathering general information about this
industry relatively easy, but selecting particular vulnerable targets in this haystack can
be a matter of either opportunity or deliberate effort. A lone operator would be able
to act only on his own experience, but a target might easily present itself. A local
cell could take the time and trouble to identify and select particular targets based
on a broad reconnaissance of its area. Gathering information about shipments of
explosives and TIH material is more difficult because they are relatively infrequent and
knowledge of their locations can be more closely controlled, although required routes
and stopping places are public information. A terrorist acting alone would almost have
to be an insider. A local cell would probably need an insider as well. STAs for drivers
and background checks for other personnel provide information and target security by
limiting inside access to vetted persons. Compliance with TSA- and DMV-administered
STAs is assured. However, operators will not do background checks unless they
intend to restrict persons who do not meet their standards, although most will at least
check employment application references. A sophisticated conspiracy could probably
persuade or coerce vetted persons to become involved in an operation.
2. Surveillance and identification of the vehicle(s) to be used in the attack. The
particular vehicle or vehicles to seize are selected on the basis of a combination of
vehicle condition (loaded or unloaded), location, and vulnerability. Vehicle and facility
security measures have a direct correlation to the capabilities of a potential attacker. A
lone operator is likely to be deterred by the mere appearance of security and to seek
an unprotected target, such as an unattended vehicle. A local cell will look for a more
vulnerable target to improve its chances of success. A sophisticated conspiracy will
choose its preferred target and will then work to defeat whatever security measures
are in place. Facilities and the vehicles at them can be well protected by the measures
described in this section if those measures are fully implemented and diligently carried
out. That is reasonably assured for vehicles carrying explosives and TIH materials but
will vary for those carrying flammable liquids and gases.
3. Seizing
designed
However,
diligently

vehicle(s). The countermeasures described in
primarily to prevent surreptitious seizure, not
the countermeasures would be effective against
implemented. The relative infrequency and high

this section are
armed hijacking.
theft if they are
risk of explosive
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and TIH-material shipments give greater assurance of compliance with those
measures. A sophisticated conspiracy would be needed to reliably defeat them.
4. Driving seized vehicle(s) to the target. Once the vehicle has been seized and
a capable driver is behind the wheel, alert and response are needed to interdict it
before it reaches its intended target. The relevant countermeasures are effective
communications with or without a vehicle tracking or disabling system. An insider driver
with little knowledge could simply drive on to the target without generating an alarm but
probably could not defeat a tracking or disabling system. A sophisticated conspiracy at
both ends of the communications link would be needed to override an alarm generated
by a vehicle tracking and/or disabling system. It would have to involve an inside driver
with full knowledge of any tracking or disabling system, someone who could mimic a
normal driver (and even a driver with a legitimate temporary problem) until he reaches
Terrorists are not mirror images of our own planning, and we must focus on how terrorists
operate, not on how we plan.
Terrorists are not bound by the analytical models used by government authorities to mitigate the
consequences of the expected next attack. They are interested in mounting a successful attack with
high loss of life by whatever means available. Hazardous materials that are not highly secured, such
as flammable liquids and gases, are weapons of opportunity and can provide that means.

his target. However, few of the many motor carriers transporting hazardous materials,
particularly carriers of gasoline and propane, presently utilize disabling systems.
5. Igniting flammables, detonating explosives, or releasing TIH materials. Once in
possession of the vehicle and in proximity to the target, the attacker would have to deal
with locking mechanisms or breach the compartment directly.
Key Observations from the Evaluation of Security Measures
Some of the security measures described in this section were already in place as safety
measures prior to 9/11. The initial response to the threat of attacks using hazmat transported
by highway was undertaken by the agencies with safety responsibility for the highway
mode, FMCSA and PHMSA. In 2002, TSA was still a new agency, and its first priority was
to federalize and deploy the people and equipment needed for the aviation security system.
In short, the security measures adopted and recommended by FMCSA and PHMSA were
common-sense best practices designed to increase security awareness and be reasonably
implemented in the near term; they were not necessarily derived from a threat analysis.
As TSA acquired the headquarters staff to address security in non-aviation modes of
transportation, it adopted a more analytical approach based on risk management according
to the consequences of an attack. This philosophy gives priority to those materials that are
seen as most hazardous to life or the environment or are disruptive to transportation or the
economy overall. Radioactive materials, high explosives, and TIH hazards are defined as
more dangerous “Tier I” Highway Security-Sensitive Materials (HSSM); flammable liquids
and (such as gasoline) and gases (such as propane) are considered less dangerous “Tier
II” HSSM. TSA has developed a comprehensive set of security action items for HSSM that
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were released to the industry on June 26, 2008. However, Tier I HSSM are transported by
a relatively small and specialized segment of the industry that is much easier to manage
than the large number of motor carriers transporting flammable liquids and gases, which
are Tier II HSSM. In short, the strength of the measures appears to be based on worstcase consequences of sophisticated, high-risk attacks envisioned by the government, not
on the average consequences of the low-risk attacks terrorists most often attempt.
TSA was not authorized to have any non-aviation inspectors in the field until after the 2004
attacks on the trains in Madrid and has been slow to exercise direct regulatory authority
in non-aviation modes. The institution of CSRs may be a step in the right direction if it is
aimed at creating better understanding and enforcement of rules, rather than collecting
data for analysis.
However, there is still confusion between federal agencies and between federal and state
authorities about the overall approach to the security of highway-transported hazmat. We
encountered this confusion about roles and responsibilities in our investigations and field
visits, finding conflicting statements between state, federal, and industry authorities about
who inspected the industry for compliance with federal regulations and recommended
practices. Security regulation and inspection, where it is undertaken at all, appears to be
an add-on to safety-related activities by personnel who are not specialized for the task.
This environment has left motor carriers largely on their own initiative to adopt and comply
with the recommended measures described in this section. In short, security regulation
Key Observations on Security Regulations
1. The security measures adopted and recommended by FMCSA and PHMSA were common-sense
best practices designed to increase security awareness and be reasonably implemented in the near
term; they were not necessarily derived from a threat analysis.
2. The strength of the measures appears to be based on worst-case consequences of sophisticated, highrisk attacks envisioned by the government, not on the average consequences of the low-risk attacks
terrorists most often attempt.
3. Inspectional jurisdiction is confused, and security inspections are weak.

and inspection jurisdiction is confused and is also weak. We would hope that TSA will
address this problem, since it is the lead federal agency.
Terrorists are not bound by the analytical models used by government authorities to mitigate
the consequences of the expected next attack. They are most interested in mounting a
successful attack with high loss of life by whatever means available. Many hazardous
materials that are not Tier I HSSM, such as flammable liquids and gases, might provide the
means. Security measures must be considered in the context of an actual attack scenario
and evaluated for their effectiveness against the capabilities of an attacker. We turn to this
evaluation in the next section.
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Analysis of the threat and potential
attacks
Introduction
We have outlined the destructive effects of flammable liquids, flammable gases, explosives,
and TIH and how these materials are transported and secured. We have also summarized
the information about these materials that might be available to terrorists, based on reports
of criminal thefts, accidents, and disposal methods.
We now analyze in depth how and whether terrorists might use these highway-borne
hazardous materials to conduct attacks, and how and whether they might use them to
destroy highway infrastructure, or instead to attempt to destroy other targets.
To make this determination, we examined targets, materials, operational and technical
complexities, and terrorist sophistication from different angles. We started with broad
questions and then drilled down to details.
This section begins with a review of terrorist objectives, statements, and actions. This
provides the general context for understanding the likelihood of terrorist attacks on highway
infrastructure in the United States. We then ask six questions:
First, how do terrorists think about targets? Irrespective of the weapons or materials
they may have access to, what kind of targets do terrorists find more desirable, and why?
What have terrorists said? What have they plotted? What have they done? The answers
give us some clues about how terrorists may view highway infrastructure as potential
targets.
Second, assuming terrorists have access to specific hazardous materials, what
targets might be most attractive? Here we assume that terrorists have acquired one of
the four highway-borne hazardous materials that, carried in bulk, can cause the greatest
loss of life or damage. We then determine which of these materials (without overwhelming
technical modification) may be best suited for attacking which targets.
Third, what operational considerations influence the selection of material and target?
These considerations are derived from our understanding of how terrorists actually operate
and how the materials might have to be altered to be used effectively. They include various
factors, including how often and how predictably the material is shipped, how well the
material is protected, and how easy it might be for a terrorist group to understand its
destructive effects. We then ask whether and what specific technical and operational
modifications might be needed to increase the chances of creating an explosion or a
devastating fire. Because the anticipated consequences of the attack—and even more
important, the probability of success—are important to the terrorists, we have attempted
to define a narrower set of attacks and materials that might be considered comparatively
more likely to succeed in meeting the terrorists’ objectives. This allows us to make further
judgments about the likelihood of hazardous materials actually being used successfully
against various targets.
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Fourth, how does the sophistication of the terrorist group affect material and target
selection? Not all terrorists have the same level of organization, technical sophistication,
resources, or determination We subdivide terrorists groups into three categories: lone
operators; local al Qaeda–inspired cells; and cells centrally funded and supported by al
Qaeda, that is, organized, funded, and directed with considerable resources and long
planning horizons. We ask which probable attacks each type of terrorist group might
be most likely to carry out using hazardous materials (but also taking into account the
availability of other materials to achieve the same objective). We assess the likelihood that
hazardous materials might be used by these specific terrorist groups and against which
targets, which allows us to further refine our conclusions about attacks against various
targets
Fifth, given the findings from the previous questions, which attacks are terrorist
groups most likely to conduct using highway-borne hazmat? We provide some
general observations on how such attacks might be carried out.
This, in turn, will set the stage for some concluding observations about additional
measures and countermeasure that should be taken to lower the probability of the most
likely attacks.

Overview of the Threat
Key Questions in Analyzing Potential Hazmat Attacks
1. How do terrorists think about targets?
2. Assuming terrorists have access to specific hazardous materials, what targets might be
most attractive?
3. What operational considerations influence the selection of material and target?
4. How does the level of sophistication of the terrorist group affect material and target
selection?
5. What are the most likely attacks terrorist groups might conduct using highway-borne
hazmat?

Before addressing the specific question of how likely terrorists in the United States are to
employ hazardous materials in attacks against any target, we review what is known about
terrorist planning in general.
Currently, al Qaeda, its affiliated organizations, and individuals or small groups inspired by
its ideology, which together comprise the jihadist universe, represent the principal terrorist
threat in the United States. There are other sources of threat—e.g., white supremacists,
animal-rights and environmental extremists who have carried out acts of violence—but
with the exception of white supremacists, they have shown little inclination toward largescale violence. Right-wing extremists in the United States have carried out large-scale
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operations (e.g., the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing) and have contemplated ambitious
schemes that would have resulted in large numbers of casualties (e.g., blowing up propane
tanks near Sacramento in 1999). Nevertheless, our threat assessment focuses on the
jihadist enterprise, the highest-level terrorist threat.
Based on their own declarations and plots that have been uncovered, it is clear that al
Qaeda’s central leadership remains committed to spectacular acts of terrorism, acts that
would come close to or exceed 9/11 in terms of casualties, emotional impact, and economic
damage.
“Al Qaeda central,” however, is only part of the threat. Since 9/11, terrorists inspired, and in
some cases assisted by al Qaeda, have carried out numerous lower-level operations, and
many more small-scale terrorist plots have been uncovered and thwarted. The deadliest of
these attacks (those in Bali, Madrid, and Mumbai) produced around 200 fatalities each. But
most of the attacks have produced fewer casualties. Bombings that are directed against
transportation targets simply because they offer concentrations of people in confined
environments are giving terrorists a “return” of about 20 fatalities per bomb on the major
successful attacks, something easily achievable with flammable gas and flammable
liquids. In other words, we cannot dismiss attacks using certain hazmat because of our
assumptions about al Qaeda’s ambitions to replicate 9/11-scale attacks. Single operatives
and local cells operate within a different framework of opportunities and objectives.
In its media campaign, al Qaeda continues to exhort its followers to violence, to take action
on their own—tacit recognition that al Qaeda cannot provide them with direct assistance.
Although there have been anecdotal reports of American volunteers being directed toward
operations abroad rather than in the United States and there is indirect evidence of
constraints imposed on terrorist “wannabes” by local Muslim communities, radicalization
and recruitment to violence continue in the United States, and certainly there is no evidence
that American could-be jihadists are receiving instructions not to carry out attacks in the
United States. The absence of attacks and the paucity of sophisticated plots, compared
with the situation in Europe, may reflect good luck and a lack of constituency, rather than
centrally imposed constraints.
The few plots uncovered in the United States thus far reveal a low level of capability and
competence. Therefore, local terrorist planning should be viewed as distinct from the more
grandiose ambitions of al Qaeda’s central leadership. While surprises are always possible,
elaborate, multi-component, combined attacks like those in Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, Morocco, Mumbai, and Madrid are not very likely in the United States.
Terrorists everywhere draw inspiration from various sources, but most of the inspiration
comes from other terrorist incidents. Repeated modes of attack become part of the terrorist
playbooks to be replicated locally. For example, the 2004 Madrid commuter train bombings
inspired the 2005 London subway bombings, which together inspired the 2006 Mumbai train
bombings. They also draw inspiration from Internet discussions and available instruction.
Terrorists listen to what we say. Government reports identifying certain vulnerabilities,
reports that terrorists may be planning certain kinds of attacks, or mere speculation that
they might do so prompt terrorists to ask themselves whether they could, in fact, do what
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is being discussed. Our concerns drive their conversations.
Finally, terrorists may draw inspiration from spectacular accidents, reports of criminal
thefts, or other newsworthy events which, in the post-9/11 world, almost invariably lead
to official or media speculation on whether terrorists might attempt to repeat them. As our
review of accidents (“Public Information that Could Inspire and Inform Terrorists” beginning
on page 25) indicates, there have been a number of spectacular highway accidents. The
2007 MacArthur Maze crash of a gasoline tanker and the resulting fire destroyed a key
freeway ramp, but far more deadly highway crashes have happened, crashes involving
gasoline tankers (Biloxi in 1998, Yonkers in 1997), propane tankers (Spain in 1978, where
over 200 people were killed at a tourist camp site, and White Plains, New York in 1994),
and TIH rail tank cars (Graniteville, South Carolina in 2005). A number of criminal thefts
of fuel oil tankers have occurred since 2006, including multiple thefts of fuel oil tankers in
Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, and Suffolk County, New Jersey; the 2007 hijacking of a
fuel tanker in Baltimore; and the May 2008 hijacking of a fuel tanker in Houston.
The chronology of terrorist plots, threats, and concerns expressed by the authorities shown
in Table 9 indicates the extent to which plots and attacks have involved gasoline tankers.
The accounts of these schemes may reflect actual plots that have been uncovered;
fables spun by captured terrorists to entertain, impress, or mislead their interrogators; the
fertile imaginations of informants determined to deliver information to eager handlers; or
hypothetical scenarios conjured up by “red teams” assigned to think as terrorists. But it is
nonetheless clear that the idea of using hazardous materials as a weapon is by now well
established in the mind of the public, and almost certainly in the minds of terrorists.

Factors Influencing Weapon Choice
It is important to understand the factors that may drive terrorists away from explosives and
toward other hazardous materials. Explosives certainly remain the principal weapons of
contemporary terrorists—bombings comprise the majority of their attacks. But terrorists
also have used fire as a substitute for explosives or to enhance the effect of their bombs.
These fires range from simple arson—a tactic favored by environmentalist extremists as
the easiest way to destroy property—to Molotov cocktails, a substitute for hand grenades,
to the tiny incendiary devices used by animal-rights fanatics to start fires in retail fur
departments, to the addition of propane tanks to increase the power of explosives.
Terrorists on at least one occasion also added toxic chemicals to conventional explosives
to increase their lethality. Reportedly, those responsible for the 1993 bombing of the World
Trade Center in New York laced their explosives with cyanide.
Just as large quantities of explosives can be concealed and brought to a variety of targets
in vehicles, so large quantities of flammable liquids or gases, or of toxic inhalants, can be
brought to a variety of suitable targets only in highway tankers or surrogate tankers.
Flammable liquids and gases have also been used as a substitute for explosives, for
example, in the 2007 terrorist attacks in London. Terrorists filled two vehicles with gasoline
and propane tanks and parked them near nightclubs in London’s busiest area, hoping to
create a gigantic explosion and a fireball that, had their devices worked, might have killed
scores of nighttime revelers. The following day, the same terrorists crashed their gasolineMineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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drenched vehicle into the terminal of the Glasgow airport, presumably seeking martyrdom
in a massive fiery explosion. They did manage to set the car on fire, and the fire engulfed a
small part of the terminal but caused no explosion—in large measure, because the terrorists
were unable to achieve the right mixture of fuel and air inside the automobile. This event is
the closest one we have to one of the scenarios envisioned in this report—an attack using
a suicide tanker. (It was erroneously reported that the tanker driven by a suicidal terrorist
into a crowd of tourists in Tunisia, killing 21 at a historic synagogue, was filled with liquefied
natural gas. The tanker actually contained conventional explosives.)
Following terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia and Morocco in 2003, there were reports
that known al Qaeda operatives have discussed pre-operational screening and acts of
intelligence involving fuel stations, fuel lorries, and underground fuel storage locations.
Authorities went on the alert in both the United Kingdom and the United States.
In another plot uncovered in the United Kingdom, terrorists were considering driving
limousines filled with flammable gases such as propane into underground garages of
buildings in London.
A recent review of terrorist chatter about weapons and tactics yields no mention of tankers
or trucks carrying other hazardous materials as weapons. However, authorities have
identified highway trailer hijacking as a possible new method of fund-raising by terrorists.
This conclusion appears to be based upon surmise, and it refers to hijackings of readily
salable cargos (such as cigarettes), not hazardous materials.
Nonetheless, as outlined in “Public Information that Could Inspire and Inform Terrorists,”
tanker thefts resulting from the rising cost of fuel can be viewed as a possible inspiration to
terrorists, although none of the thefts thus far has had any nexus with terrorism.
From a terrorist perspective, vehicles containing thousands of gallons of flammable liquids
or gases would seem to offer an attractive target that can be turned into a destructive
weapon. However, those with detailed knowledge inside the trucking industry apparently
see little threat. According to our field interviews, they base their view largely on the
assumption that terrorists would prefer explosives, which they could easily manufacture,
and the fact that it is not easy to “detonate” a cargo of gasoline.
Increased government monitoring of large-quantity sales of chemicals that can be used to
make explosives (e.g., ammonium nitrate fertilizer) and the technical difficulties of detonating
a large quantity of homemade explosives have created some challenges to bombmaking.
Less expertise is needed to seize a gasoline tanker, drive it to a target, release the fuel,
and ignite it to achieve considerable damage. However, significantly greater sophistication
is needed to achieve a similar level of destruction using propane tankers.
In addition, ideas for operations may arise from personal experiences of the planners
themselves—special knowledge, work experience, or access. And given the large number
of companies, especially independent contractors and private owners involved in the
carriage of propane and gasoline, the chances of an idea forming and the level of knowledge
necessary to carry out a successful attack being acquired are increasing. Terrorists are
opportunists, as mentioned before, and the opportunities are significant, including the
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opportunities that hijacked gasoline tankers create
The terrorists we are talking about are lethal and destructive. Purely symbolic violence
does not suffice. They want very high body counts and massive destruction. But they also
want their attacks to succeed, even if they themselves are willing to die in the attempt—
indeed, they are especially concerned about success in such cases, since they get only
one try. For religiously inspired terrorists, success is evidence of God’s favor. A yield of
100 or 200 casualties is evidence enough.
This pushes terrorists toward soft targets, tested tactics, and accessible weapons.
Availability, ease of access, and knowledge requirements drive terrorist planning. When
high-consequence results are weighed against certainty of success, certainty of success
wins. From the standpoint of availability, ease of access, and knowledge requirements,
flammable materials, such gasoline and, to a lesser extent propane, should be reevaluated
as possible terrorist weapons for use against soft targets that can yield significant but not
catastrophic numbers of casualties in the United States.

Key Questions
1. How do terrorists think about targets?
We can best answer this question by looking at the statements, plots, and attacks carried
out by (1) all terrorists and (2) jihadists such as al Qaeda. In this analysis, we consider
the entire spectrum of weapons, not just weaponized hazardous materials transported by
highway, and the entire spectrum of targets. We establish a general priority of targets for
Jihadists and for other terrorists. However, we exclude terrorist attacks conducted as part
of an active insurgency in an area of active operations.

Categories of Targets
While there are probably an infinite number of possible terrorist target categories, the
history of terrorist attacks suggests that the following may be a useful categorization of
potential targets in the United States:
1. Prominent government, political, and financial figures, such as the president and
vice president, cabinet officers, and prominent CEOs. Over the years, terrorists have
assassinated the prime minister of Spain and the former prime minister of Italy, and they
have attempted to assassinate the prime minister of the United Kingdom. Prominent
business executives have been targets primarily of kidnappings in Europe and Latin
America; there are no cases of such kidnappings in the United States (although the
daughter of the prominent Hearst family was kidnapped by domestic terrorists in
1974).
2. Government buildings, particularly iconic structures such as the White House, the
Department of State, the Pentagon, and CIA headquarters. The 1995 Bojinka plot
included reference to crashing a plane into CIA headquarters, and the U.S. Capitol
was bombed in 1983.
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Table 9 Selected Attacks Involving Gasoline Tankers and Official Concerns
About the Threat
January 1982: IRA terrorists ditch a hijacked gasoline tanker under a rail bridge, halting all trains from
Belfast to Dublin until authorities can determine that the rig is not booby-trapped and can be safely
removed.
June 1996: Terrorists launch a suicide attack on Khobar Towers, an American military housing site in Saudi
Arabia, killing 19. The vehicle employed was a tanker truck loaded with explosives, not flammables.
April 2002: A suicide attacker drives a tanker truck into a group of tourists at a synagogue in Djerba,
Tunisia, killing 21. The tanker was filled with explosives, not flammables; nevertheless, it is often reported
as a fuel tanker attack.
May 2002: Terrorists in Israel secretly attach a remotely detonated bomb to a gasoline fuel tanker and set
it off when the truck is at a fuel terminal.
June 2002: The FBI warns that fuel tankers may be used to attack synagogues, although it says that it has
no evidence of such a plot.
September 2002: Afghan authorities intercept a booby-trapped tanker loaded with jet fuel, preventing it
from entering the U.S. air base at Bagram.
February 2003: The first of a series of reports of al Qaeda plots to attack gas stations with stolen or
hijacked tankers appears. The report indicates that terrorists are also targeting bridges.
April 2003: More detailed reports of terrorist plots are released, based upon decoding of captured al
Qaeda chief operational planner Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s disc drive. Authorities find “evidence of
several potential al Qaeda plots involving tanker trucks,” including plans for “hijacking fuel tankers on
the highways, modifying milk carriers to hold gasoline, attaching remote control bombs to unsuspecting
propane trucks.” Further intelligence indicates that a terrorist operative posed as a potential buyer of a
gas station in the United States to collect information on tanker routes, fuel delivery schedules, and tank
filling procedures.
January 2004: Japanese authorities envision hijacked tanker trucks used as bombs in Tokyo.
April 2004: The report of a stolen tanker truck in New Jersey raises concerns about terrorism.
June 2004: Reports of tanker trucks stolen and hijacked in Iraq to be used in truck bombings appear.
August 2004: In a widely publicized report, a captured operative reveals that al Qaeda plotters had
questioned “whether a hijacked oil tanker truck could serve as an effective weapon.”
June 2005: A report on hazardous materials reveals that a Pakistani ordered out of the country in 1996
was still driving gasoline tanker trucks for various oil companies eight years later.
August 2005: A report indicates that jihadists were talking about using suicide drivers to drive hijacked
fuel tankers into gas stations to cause mass casualties. The discussions considered using water trucks
filled with gasoline. New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles were mentioned specifically as targets. Although
the discussion parallels earlier revelations, the source in this case is considered to be of questionable
reliability.

3. Commercial property, especially financial institutions, and corporate headquarters The
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) was reconnoitered as a target, along with financial
institutions in New York and Washington. Corporate headquarters were frequent targets
of symbolic terrorist bombings in the 1960s and 1970s.
4. Critical infrastructure, such as nodes of telecommunications, transportation (including
highways), water, and power. Within transportation, there are categories of targets
that have been repeatedly attacked (commercial airliners) and more recently attacked
(mass surface transportation). The airliner has long been a symbol of U.S. sovereignty,
and flying accidents, from which most people consider no escape possible, have
always attracted intense public fear and attention. Surface transportation provides
concentrations of people in situations where it is difficult to protect families.
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5. Iconic symbols of the United States, or of a particular region. Internationally recognized
national icons include the Statue of Liberty in New York; and the Lincoln, Washington,
and Jefferson Memorials in Washington DC. The financial engine of the United States
is probably best symbolized in the Wall Street Stock Exchange in New York. So-called
“sub-iconic symbols,” which represent a city or a region include various other bridges
or buildings in cities.
6. Public gatherings outside of buildings (e.g., open-air celebrations that occur regularly
throughout the year, but particularly on national holidays).
7. Large numbers of civilians inside public venues (such as at stadiums during sporting
events, in crowded shopping malls, in hotel lobbies, in crowded cafes and restaurants,
or in train stations or airports). These have been the principal targets of al Qaeda since
9/11.
8. Large numbers of civilians inside multiunit residential buildings. Residential compounds
were attacked in Saudi Arabia because they housed large numbers of foreigners.

Al Qaeda and Other Jihadist Groups
The threat posed by al Qaeda and groups associated with it is somewhat easier to analyze
than that of other groups because al Qaeda’s declarations, plots, and attacks are fairly
consistent and suggest a distinct prioritization of targets.
Al Qaeda urges its followers to carry out attacks that will produce high body counts and
will have symbolic value—in jihadist language, attacks on targets that have “emotional”
value (iconic targets)—and attacks that will cause serious economic damage. The iconic
component can refer either to the destruction of an internationally recognized icon or to
an iconic venue. In the latter case, the destruction of the target would not necessarily
be the goal. The venue would merely be a dramatic backdrop that would increase the
psychological impact of the attack.
In fact, however, few of the jihadist attacks and plots since 9/11 have included iconic
targets or venues, although diplomatic facilities and even nightclubs the jihadists consider
sinful do have symbolic content. And despite the continued drumbeat about economic
warfare in al Qaeda communications, the economic impact of the terrorist attacks since
9/11 has been incidental—for example, attacks on hotels do adversely impact tourism.
Almost all of the jihadist attacks since 9/11 have been directed against soft targets—that is,
unprotected or lightly protected targets such as hotels (Indonesia, Kenya, Jordan, Egypt,
Pakistan), restaurants and nightclubs (Indonesia, Morocco, United Kingdom), public
surface transportation (Spain, United Kingdom, Philippines, India), residential compounds
(Saudi Arabia), and high-profile individuals. Terrorist attacks on embassies, consulates,
and commercial buildings (Indonesia, Pakistan, and Turkey) have used vehicle bombs on
the street; in other words, they have not attempted to penetrate security. Only in a couple
of instances have terrorists attacked government buildings or, in one case, a refinery
(Saudi Arabia), which are likely to have higher levels of security. This again suggests a
low tolerance for risk of failure. The detonation of the terrorist devices, even beyond any
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security perimeter, still resulted in casualties and destruction. The avoidance of security
does not mean that the terrorists were averse to personal risk, since many of these were
suicide attacks. We are talking about operational risks.
A review of the terrorist plots that were uncovered during the same period reveals greater
operational ambition (use of exotic substances, multipart operations) to attack more diverse
but still similar targets. Most of the plots involved attacks on public surface transportation—
the killing fields of terrorists bent upon slaughter. Embassies figured in several plots, along
with other government buildings and military headquarters. Several plots involved attacks
on naval or civilian vessels, like the attacks on the U.S.S. Cole or the French supertanker
Limburg. However, soft targets predominate.
Bridges were cited as targets in a few plots, but these plots were uncovered at the “thinking
about” or reconnaissance stage, before any operational planning. There is no evidence that
terrorists had or could easily have acquired the means to successfully carry out attacks
against inherently robust targets in the transportation sector.
On the basis of this analysis and the list of targets we started with, certain priorities
emerge.
The most valuable targets are those that promise the highest body counts. In addition to
public transportation, these include outside public assemblies and large numbers of people
inside residential or public buildings. The terror effects increase if: (1) attacks yield deaths
that are hard to avoid (hitting the public in areas that were previously thought safe), (2)
they happen nearly simultaneously in different places, and (3) they can generate horrific
deaths, for example, trapping and burning people in closed buildings. If such attacks can
take place against the backdrop of an internationally recognized U.S. icon, their value
increases even more.
The second-most valuable targets (or at least venues) are national icons. However, the
value of these targets would increase significantly if attacks also caused both substantial
numbers of casualties and economic harm. The paradigm for such attacks is, of course,
the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center.
The third most valuable targets would be key nodes of infrastructure that, if attacked, might
yield sustained economic harm. These include oil refineries or terminals, port facilities,
pipelines, and energy facilities. Again, attacks that coincidentally create large numbers of
casualties are of higher value.

Other Terrorists in the United States
Other sources of terrorist attacks in the United States range from the Animal Liberation
Front and violent environmental activists to right-wing extremists and white supremacists.
For these groups, the priority of targets is primarily dictated by the specific objective of
the attack, because these groups are motivated by narrowly defined issues. While the
Oklahoma City bombing resulted in a significant number of casualties, it is important to
realize that in the mind of the bomber, Timothy McVeigh, the objective was to destroy
a federal government building with government employees, not civilian bystanders. In
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another case, authorities arrested right-wing extremists who plotted in 1999 to blow up
huge propane storage tanks in Elk Grove, near Sacramento, California. Had the attack
been carried out, it could have caused fatalities among nearby residents.28
It is difficult to define precisely the ranking of targets for such a large range of groups.
However, certain trends do emerge. Declarations, plots, and actions show that these attackers tend to:
1. Focus on targets (individuals, infrastructure, or buildings) that are specifically associated,
as part of the government or as part of a company, with the specific policies or entity
being targeted. Two examples are the bombings of IRS offices and the assaults on
laboratories or individuals engaged in animal research.
2. Focus on controlling economic damage and on limiting collateral casualties. For
example, recent environmental fires set in housing developments by environmental
extremists specifically excluded occupied buildings. Attacks on animal testing labs
have similarly avoided human casualties, although some animal-rights extremists
have targeted individuals.
3. Make no mention of transportation infrastructure.
4. Almost never target bystanders, either in open-air public gatherings or inside residential
or other public buildings.
In summary, then, non-jihadist target selection tends to favor acts against individuals,
symbols of the U.S. government, or a particular policy, project, or practice. It does not tend
to favor critical infrastructure, including highway infrastructure, and, except in the case
of right-wing extremists, it does not favor attacks that create large numbers of fatalities.
In fact, when we look beyond contemporary jihadist terrorists outside the United States,
we see that bridges have figured as targets in a very small fraction of terrorist attacks on
surface transportation in recent decades. Moreover, these attacks were against small
structures, and more important, they occurred in conflict zones where guerrilla armies were
engaged in sustained systematic campaigns of sabotage to undermine local economies.
In the more developed countries, serious assaults on bridges and tunnels are generally
confined to wartime sabotage.
2. Assuming terrorists have access to specific hazardous materials, what targets
might be most attractive?
In the discussion above, we assumed that planning starts with target selection and
proceeds to acquiring hazardous materials with which to attack. Another approach would
be to assume that terrorists have acquired or can easily acquire a specific hazardous
material and then examine the targets they might select to attack with that material. Here,
target selection is the driven by the particular hazardous material involved.
We shall attempt to rank or describe the most attractive targets for an individual, cell, or
group that has acquired or has easy access to one of the following materials:
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1. A truckload quantity of flammable liquids, such as gasoline
2. A truckload quantity of a flammable gas, such as propane
3. A truckload quantity of a Division 1.5 commercial explosive, such as ANFO
4. A truckload quantity of a TIH material, such as chlorine.
The authors have examined categories of targets and assessed those that are most
attractive for each hazardous materials, although targets may be opportunistic—that is,
much depends on what is available within the general vicinity of the hazardous material
that has been acquired, and the target characteristics itself. Those results are too sensitive
to be presented in a public report. The one conclusion from this analysis that can be
conveyed is that there are many more-attractive targets than highway infrastructure that
could be attacked with these materials, such as office and residential buildings, along with
shopping malls.
The discussion following Question 3 (page 58) addresses operational considerations
that vary by hazardous material and targets. When terrorists have already obtained the
hazardous materials, the likelihood of success of an attack or the extent of the damage that
could be caused by it may vary considerably, depending on the target. Also, some targets
may be vulnerable to specific hazardous materials, but not to others.
Target vulnerabilities may limit the suitability of a specific hazardous material for attacking
it. For instance, a flammable liquid such as gasoline is best suited for attacking structures
susceptible to fire. The ability to get the flammable material to a critical location is also a
factor. As a general rule, physical structures are most vulnerable to explosives, because
of the “reach” of these materials and the wide array of structures they could be used to
attack.
Highway infrastructure would present difficult targets for terrorists, particularly if damage
to the infrastructure is the only objective of an attack. Destruction of overpasses whose
steel supports are vulnerable to fire (the type of structure most readily damaged) simply
would not have the economic effects sought by terrorists, nor would their destruction
cause significant casualties. Tunnels bored through hard rock might be difficult to collapse
even with significant quantities of explosive, although their support structures could be
temporarily compromised. Even if successfully attacked, they may have limited impact due
to the existence of alternative transportation routes—although tunnels, because they are
used often as a last resort in transportation planning, may create more economic dislocation
than the loss of other highway points.
Only when coupled with the possibility of causing significant numbers of fatalities and
injuries do these targets really become more attractive.
The type of highway infrastructure most likely to be a potential target of terrorism is probably
iconic suspension bridges. Certainly, carefully engineered attacks using explosives could
pose risks to such bridges. In theory, flammable liquids and flammable gases could damage
support structure, but the operational complications present significant impediments to an
attack using these materials.
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3. How do operational considerations influence material and target
selection?
Several factors affect the choice of hazardous materials for conducting an attack and
the targets that might be selected. Accessibility of the hazardous material, vulnerability
of targets, and a sense of the likelihood of a successful attack are the most important
operational considerations. These considerations also vary with the sophistication of the
individual terrorist or group, discussed below.

Accessibility of the Hazardous Material
One of the most critical considerations in any attack is to the difficulty of obtaining a hazardous
material capable of causing significant damage to people or structures. Characteristics of
hazardous-materials transportation play important roles in these considerations, along
with how well the materials are secured. Key transportation characteristics for the four
types of hazmat of interest in this study are as follows:							
1. Flammable liquids. Gasoline is the hazardous material most frequently
transported in large quantities by truck. They would be relatively easy to observe,
with points of origin and destination well known: Gasoline is delivered in public
venues that have open access and little security. Opportunity exists for insiders
to acquire truckload quantities of these materials, both as vehicle drivers and as
operators or employees at the delivery location.
2. Flammable gases. Although not as accessible as gasoline, propane is still
an easily identifiable hazardous material whose shipment patterns are
observable. 										
Security countermeasures for flammable liquids and gases are the same as those for
other bulk hazardous materials. If all or most of the recommended countermeasures
are implemented, a facility will be reasonably secure from intruders. En route security
depends largely on attending or locking or sealing the vehicle.
3. Explosives. Bulk quantities of commercial explosives are delivered by truck
infrequently, and security can be expected to be higher than security for the other
hazardous materials considered in this study. Specialized or insider knowledge
would be almost essential to acquiring these materials for a terrorist attack.		
									
4. TIH Materials. Highway shipments in bulk quantities of the TIH materials that
pose the greatest security risks, such as chlorine, are very infrequent. Specialized
or insider knowledge would be required to acquire and use these weapons. And
while anhydrous ammonia is frequently shipped, it is a Zone D TIH material, the
least lethal type, and is of limited value in terrorist scenarios.
Security countermeasures for explosives and TIH materials are similar, and because of
the high risk posed by shipments of these materials, operator diligence in implementing
the measures is more assured. Drivers are thoroughly vetted. Facility security for
explosives operations is generally high. The high level of attention given to TIH materials
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by authorities and the public is also a factor in compliance. Shipments of explosives or
TIH materials occur relatively infrequently
As stated earlier, it is also important to remember that terrorists learn from reports of
accidents and thefts and from some hazardous-materials disposal operations. They can,
with reasonable effort, learn that flammable liquids (particularly gasoline) are transported
frequently; that these materials ignite easily, that they can create very intense fires; and
that they can be hijacked and brought to a large array of targets.
Terrorists can understand from reports of both rail and highway tanker accidents that
flammable gas, such as propane, can, under just the right circumstances, explode and
create a fireball and blast damage that is as great as that from a large amount of explosives,
with the potential of killing many people if they can be found in high concentrations. But
they might not understand just how difficult it is to achieve such an effect, especially the
difficulty of directing energy at a particular piece of a target.
Terrorists would know that explosives are not transported as frequently as flammable liquids
and flammable gases, and that they are stable during normal transportation conditions.
However, they would also know that explosives, if detonated, can cause significant
damage.
Finally, terrorists might observe that under the right conditions, casualties resulting from
release of TIH materials can be catastrophic; however, they could also see from accident
reports that if victims are not placed in precisely the right position, surprisingly little damage
may occur. They would also rightly infer that most TIH material shipments are by rail car.

Vulnerabilities of Targets
Specific vulnerabilities of specific targets make certain types of hazardous materials better
suited to attack them and may alter the way a material is used (or whether it can be
used) in an attack. The effects of target vulnerabilities on operational considerations for the
hazardous materials considered in this study are discussed below.					
1.

2.

3.

Flammable liquids. Releasing and igniting the contents of a gasoline tanker does
not pose significant technical difficulties. The ability to position a gasoline tanker
inside or under a target would be the most critical operational consideration.
There are many targets with a large number of occupants where this may not
pose significant difficulties. 							
Flammable gases. A flammable gas is far more difficult to release and ignite than
a flammable liquid. The pressurized gas tanks are more robust and releasing and
directing the gas requires fairly good timing skills. Even more important creating
an explosion (especially one that is timed, placed, and well directed) rather than
simply a fire is very difficult.						
Explosives. Perhaps the greatest operational complexity in the use of bulk
quantities of commercial explosives would be in knowing how to place a detonator
and booster charge to detonate a significant portion of the explosives shipment.
The types of commercial explosives transport vehicles are more varied than the
types of vehicles for flammable liquids and gases. Thus, more expertise and
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4.

specialized capabilities are necessary to plan an attack using explosives in
transportation. In addition, some commercial explosives are shipped as oxidizers
and must be sensitized before use. Again, specialized knowledge and expertise
are required. Explosives do have the advantage of being able to affect targets at
great distances, and a near-instantaneous explosion offers less time to prevent
or mitigate consequences.
TIH materials. The only potential targets of TIH materials are people. For an
attack to be successful, it would be necessary to release the entire contents
of a bulk highway shipment of TIH material as quickly as possible in close
proximity to large numbers of people. The robust nature of the packaging acts
as a deterrent, as does the presence of structures where sheltering is possible.
A terrorist would also need to be concerned with complex meteorological
considerations (temperature, wind direction, wind speed) in planning an attack
using TIH materials.

Likelihood of a Successful Attack
1. While most terrorists desire the greatest possible amount of fatalities or
destruction, a terrorist planning an attack would place a premium on the surety
of achieving results above a threshold level, rather than achieving maximum
consequences. Uncertainty of results using the hazardous materials of interest
in this study is evaluated below.								
2. Flammable liquids. Hazardous materials such as gasoline offer a relatively easy
path to achieving an event with at least moderate consequences. 			
3. Flammable gases. Achieving a fire of a certain magnitude is within the capability
of many terrorists. The ability to produce an explosion might be considered as
a bonus, though it is very difficult to do. Operational difficulties are much higher
than those with gasoline for most targets, which reduces the likelihood of a
successful attack. 								
4. Explosives. Predictability of outcomes from conventional attacks with explosives
is the standard by which other terrorist events must be evaluated. Terrorists
attempting to obtain explosives from transportation risk detection, and there are
steps where things can go wrong; explosives have the potential to produce high
numbers of fatalities and significant damage to structures. 		
5. TIH materials. Consequences from using this category of materials are the
most variable or uncertain. Lack of everyday experience with the materials;
potential difficulties obtaining, opening, and controlling releases from highway
shipments; and unreliability in obtaining predictable levels of casualties make
these materials less-than-ideal weapons for terrorists. Maximum possible
casualties may be very high if everything in an attack goes correctly; however,
variability is still high, and the median or average for any event is likely to be low
in comparison with that of other hazardous materials.
It is important to note that potential lack of knowledge about the actual probability of
success of a terrorist attack plays a complex role in planning such attacks or developing
strategies to counter them. For example, a terrorist may be drawn to attempting an attack
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with a low probability of success based on dramatic but infrequent images of accidental
hazardous-material events. The difficulties of creating an explosion using propane may
be countered by the visual effects of spectacular events that have occurred. We may be
surprised when a successful attack occurs, since both attacker and defender are operating
with many unknowns and an experience base that is incomplete.
Figure 4 shows a rough correlation of the probability of a successful attack and a reasonable
upper limit of achievable consequences for the hazardous materials of interest in this study.
It is based on the study team’s judgment concerning real-world operational constraints
and history, rather than a worst-case model. It does not consider access and vulnerability
issues. It was arrived at by consensus, but without using formal techniques or methods.
Fatalities can be thought of as a reasonable higher-level total (but not worst case) that
might be expected from a successful attack. Probability can be thought of as the likelihood
of achieving a successful attack with significant numbers of fatalities, given that an attack
occurs. Full contours are not shown on the graph in order to simplify understanding (i.e.,
it is possible for each of the materials to obtain “up to” lower numbers of fatalities with
increasing probability). The purpose of the figure is to provide a general sense of the
potential risks (consequence and probability) of terrorist attacks using these hazardous
materials.

Figure 4 Estimated Correlations of Probability of Success of
an Attack a potential consequences
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4. How does the sophistication of the terrorist group affect material and
target selection?
The ability to obtain hazardous material depends on the terrorist’s available planning and
funding. Even once the material has been obtained, the terrorist and/or terrorist cell needs
to have a certain level of sophistication to take down a specific target. Each of the subgroups
(the lone operator, locally inspired jihadist cells, and groups funded and supported by al
Qaeda central) has a unique set of operational assumptions that limit its ability to acquire
material or select targets. Before determining plausible attack scenarios, we need to
consider the operational assumptions and the capability limits of each subgroup.
The Lone Operator. The lone operator may be one who turns to a Jihadist ideology
because of a personal loss or sense of alienation. As they become indoctrinated, lone
operators may decide to strike at society for perceived personal insults or assaults to
Islam that are spread through Jihadist literature. Depending on circumstances, a lone
operator may become the catalyst who starts a local jihadist cell.
Obviously, a lone operator will have limited funding, because there is no organization to
bankroll his operation. Lacking an organization, a lone operator may resort to petty crime
to obtain funds. But this risks greater exposure to law enforcement and possible detection
and incarceration. Most likely, lone operators will fund their own operations. They thus
must maintain a low profile that limits their possible attack scenarios.
The level of planning of lone operators will vary, depending on such factors as access
to information, prior knowledge of intended target sets or hazardous material, access to
material, and overall mindset, e.g., focus on detail versus impulsive action, determination,
quickness to act, and temperament. We assume that a lone operator’s level of planning
detail will be limited due to personnel and resource constraints, so materials and targets
will be chosen because of the convenience of access. Except for suicide bombers, lone
operators are inclined not to martyr themselves.

Local Al Qaeda-Inspired Cells
The local al Qaeda-inspired cell may consist of first- or second-generation immigrants
or converts to Islam who are knowledgeable about local customs and culture. They are
integrated into the society and have the rights and benefits afforded to all of the countries’
citizens. Usually, a catalyst organizes the local al Qaeda-inspired cell. Members may be
usually radicalized through jihadist or Salafi websites, in the prison system, or in radical
meeting places.
Local cells are connected by ideology and personal ties, not through a hierarchical structure.
Members gravitate to each other based on that ideology and personal relationships. Some
of these groups may be amorphous and temporary, but others may establish longer-term
partnerships in a sustained campaign directed by a central figure.
Due to the nature of local cells, funding is more of a necessity for them than for the
lone operator. Funding comes from sources such as criminal activity (e.g., the babyformula black market, cigarette smuggling, and distribution of counterfeit items) or local
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sympathizers. Criminal activity increases a cell’s exposure to local law enforcement and
detection through intelligence-based policing. Foreign intelligence sources are of very little
value in detecting these cells beyond providing trend analysis of increased local Jihadist
cells in other countries.
A local cell’s planning for a possible attack is more in-depth and involved than that of the lone
operator. Since the cell obviously has more than one member, individuals can be tasked
with specific assignments, and tailored research can be done. Cell members may also
be recruited for a specialty they possess. Planning is still at a rudimentary level because:
(1) local cells cannot take advantage of the resources and knowledge that comes from a
central and presumably more professional and well-financed authority; (2) the members
have uneven training, mostly through websites, videos, printed manuals, etc., and very
little hands-on practical experience; and (3) cell members are from the local community
and have very little operational experience.
Cells Funded and Supported by al Qaeda Central. Such cells may consist of “foreign”
Islamists or a mix of foreign Islamists and radicalized local members under the direction
of the foreign Islamists. At least some members are likely to have received training and
operational experience in either Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, or Pakistan. They have handson experience and specialties in explosives, munitions, weapons, etc. Many may have
been involved in operations against foreign targets, most likely in Bosnia or Iraq.
Al Qaeda centrally funded and supported cells are not dependent on local funding. Money
is funneled to them from al Qaeda “headquarters,” through the use of hawala29 or an
informal banking system built on trust. These cells are better financed and therefore freer
to develop more-sophisticated operations.
The centrally funded and supported cells are not constrained by time. Operatives can be
infiltrated into a country through various methods (student visas, border crossings, tourist
visas, etc.) and can integrate into society, although actual cases suggest that operatives
tend to hit the ground running. Planning is highly sophisticated, because the objectives of
these cells are to inflict significant casualties and to hit high-priority targets. They are more
likely to engage in reconnaissance to maximize the effect of an attack, while minimizing
their losses. As part of the planning process, they will probe and test security measures
to find a target’s weaknesses or a softer target. They are constrained not by time but by
operational success.
The centrally funded and supported cells also possess greater expertise. As noted before,
their members most likely have practical training and operational experience. Depending
on the nature of a planned operation, the cell members may be specialists in either the
type of target or the weapons to be used, or they may go through the training necessary to
gain access to possible assets. Finally, these cells have more sophisticated knowledge in
tradecraft, and members are more apt to engage in reconnaissance over a period of time
to determine routines and routes of prospective targets.

Acquisition of Hazardous Materials
The level of sophistication of a terrorist group or individual is not the only determining
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factor in hazardous material acquisition. The ease of acquisition of the material plays a
significant part in the planning process. Another significant factor is the patience of the
group. If a group does not have an impulsive desire to strike quickly, it may be inclined to
either recruit a legitimate driver to its cause (to deliver the material to either an operative
or a target site) or become certified to transport hazardous material. Characteristics of
hazardous materials transportation play important roles in these considerations.
Conceivably, a lone operative could obtain any hazardous material except military
explosives. Frequency of transport and less than adequate security countermeasures
provide an opportunity for terrorists to obtain flammable liquids. Materials in the other three
categories could also conceivably be obtained; however, the need for more information
on movement and on ways to “weaponize,” along with the need for reconnaissance of
delivery routes, makes obtaining these materials more difficult unless the group has an
insider as part of the operation.

Vehicle Acquisition
There are a number of ways to acquire a hazardous material vehicle: stealing/hijacking,
turning an insider, or through legal means. Groups with limited funding will require more
drastic and impulsive methods of acquisition, such as stealing/hijacking; as the terrorists’
level of sophistication and patience increases, the method of acquisition is more likely to
be through legal means or through turning an insider to either deliver the vehicle to an
operative or conduct the operation.
While hijacking a tanker may be the easiest method of acquiring one, there are others.
The next possibility is turning an insider. This is more complicated and can range from
duping an insider into thinking that he is participating in a simple theft to radicalizing one
who will do what he can for the cause. The insider is a particularly dangerous factor; he or
she has every reason to keep the operation secret but has no reason to hesitate or not go
ahead, either because of money (if he has no knowledge of terrorist ties) or subscription
to a jihadist ideology. The third method of acquisition is through legal means. This is by far
the most time-consuming method, but it is not overly complicated. The process to become
a legally certified hazardous-material driver is not difficult or expensive.
A lone operator may not be able to meet the security thresholds the state and
federal governments have established for obtaining a CDL which, absent getting a
hazardous materials endorsement, does not prompt TSA to conduct an STA against
various databases. A lone operator may or may not have a clean record, which will
be relevant if he wishes to obtain a legal CDL. Also, a lone operator may be more
impulsive and may opt for a quick and simple illegal method. Terrorist cells may
be more inclined to have members obtain a legal CDL license. To circumvent the
background checks, members who have clean records and have been radicalized
within the United States will be most likely to go through the CDL certification process.

Delivery Methods
Delivery and execution of an operation will vary among terrorist groups, but the success of
the operation is the most important factor for all three subgroups, and success is measured
by body count, not by the destruction of infrastructure.
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A lone operative is most likely to hijack a vehicle and use it on a target of opportunity, such
as a crowded outside area or a building from which escape is not easy.
Local cells might use hijacking, coercion of drivers, or legal certification of a driver to
conduct an operation. However, the attack scenario will vary, depending on the level of
sophistication of the members. A locally inspired jihadist cell is more likely to create a multievent, rather than an attack on a single target of opportunity.
The level of sophistication of an al Qaeda centrally funded and supported cell reduces
the need to resort to hijacking; instead, coercion and legal certification of operatives are
highly probable. Alternatively, the cell might establish a legitimate hazmat carrier company,
especially a fuel-carrier company, as a front.

5. What are the most likely attacks that terrorist groups might conduct using
highway-borne hazmat?
A number of factors go into determining the most likely use of highway-borne hazardous
materials by terrorists. In the following, we recap some of our previous conclusions and
apply them.
A. Terrorists’ primary objective is to achieve a significant number of deaths—
say, 100 or more—with as much certainty as possible. They are not
inclined to take significant risks in order to achieve thousands of fatalities.
B. To the extent that multiple attacks can be conducted, the net effect is greater
than the number of fatalities. Two or three attacks on the same day have
a greater impact than three attacks separated by many weeks or months.
C. The ability to acquire a hazardous material, deliver it, and properly release it
for destructive effect is key. Knowledge and access are important because:
1. Patterns of gasoline and propane shipments are often predictable, the
technical knowledge needed to drive a truck is not extensive and there are many
experienced truck drivers, procedural and technical security measures need
improvement, and there is a pattern of non-terrorist criminal thefts of tankers.
2. Security measures for explosives and TIH materials are higher
than those for flammable liquids and gases, and there are plans to
increase them. These materials are also transported less frequently.
D. The ability to achieve hundreds of fatalities at different targets without significant technical complication is important. In this respect, we note that:
1. There are many buildings and other crowded environments, including long
tunnels, in which truckload explosives could kill hundreds. However, even
though truckload explosives are the weapon of choice for attacking such
targets, explosives are transported less frequently and they have more
security; also, it is becoming more difficult to create homemade explosives.
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2. There are also many environments in which a gasoline tanker could be used
to create an intense fire that could result in a high number of casualties,
including many public or residential buildings, as terrorists have discussed, or
possibly long tunnels. Public transportation stations, if not properly guarded
from penetration by vehicle-borne materials, represent another target.
3. Although spectacular accidents may create the impression that propane tankers
can create an even larger number of fatalities, the technical sophistication
required to ignite propane is greater than that which is required to ignite
gasoline, and even more technical knowledge is needed to cause it to explode.
4. When there are numerous unmonitored targets, reconnaissance and planning
become easier, allowing for the planning of multiple attacks without detection.
Given all of these considerations, we do not believe that terrorists—particularly lone
operators or local jihadist cells, but even a well-organized al Qaeda operation—would
use hazardous materials to attempt to destroy highway infrastructure. Those targets that
can be brought down easily do not have sufficient value to be attractive, and those that do
have value cannot easily be destroyed with hazardous materials.
Second, there are many targets that are far more likely to achieve terrorist objectives.
We believe the most likely use of highway-borne hazardous materials by terrorists would
involve targets other than highway infrastructure. These include, most importantly, public
and residential buildings, and public assemblies

Countermeasures for Consideration
There are a number of general countermeasures that should be considered.

General Security Procedures and Technologies.
State and federal authorities should work together to:
1. Along with industry associations, increase the required and recommended security
measures that apply to the gasoline tanker and propane tanker fleets. Clearly, the
federal government considers gasoline and propane to be “lower-consequence”
materials. MTI considers them to be higher-probability materials for attacks with
average, yet lethal, consequences.
2. Urgently resolve jurisdictional issues and increase the strength of inspection of
hazardous materials security measures implemented in the field. It is critical that
federal or state inspectors ensure that required measures are implemented and that
recommended measures are understood and encouraged.
3. Attempt to find ways to encourage the implementation of vehicle tracking and
immobilization and to apply these technologies to the gasoline and propane tanker
fleets (see last section below).
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4. Encourage the highest possible degree of coordination between the federal and state
authorities and centers that will be involved in responding to a terrorist threat or actual
attack involving highway-borne hazmat used against highway infrastructure. There are
many such authorities and centers, and their power relative to each other will no doubt
continue to evolve over time. This suggests that state authorities should maintain a
current understanding of how these authorities and centers would actually respond
to threats and attacks, by studying them thoroughly and by participating wherever
possible in exercises to gain this insight. The federal authorities and centers that can
be involved are many; they include the long-standing FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task
Force (JTTF) and the newer Fusion Centers; the Federal Inter-Agency Group (FIG);
the DHS led National Infrastructure Coordination Center (NICC) and the National
Operations Center (NOC); TSA’s Terrorist Screening Center; and FEMA’s field office
and command center.

Encourage Vehicle Tracking and Immobilization.
Finally, we turn to the topic of vehicle tracking and immobilization. In additional research
provided in MTI report 09-04, we concluded that there is an increasing trend—driven
primarily by perceived gains in economic efficiency and safety—toward implementing
vehicle and, more recently, trailer tracking. In addition, efforts are being formed, by
Qualcomm and MAGTEC, for example, to develop safe and reliable ways to immobilize
trucks that unauthorized drivers have attempted to start or that hijackers have attempted to
take over. These techniques include relatively sophisticated and layered levels of required
authentication, depending on the event. For example, with immobilization and tracking
technology implemented, even if a vehicle is idling—as it can be if a driver is attending
the vehicle but not in it—it cannot be driven, and it will essentially experience an engine
kill if the driver does not input a unique access code. And even if a hijacker is able to drive
the vehicle, a driver or someone else who observes the hijacking can ask that a tracking
center remotely disable the vehicle, which is done safely in 12 steps as the vehicle loses
accelerating power. Apparently driven by the need to prevent theft of high-value cargo, such
as cigarettes, some motor carriers are deploying this technology, which the most recent
FMCSA pilot program demonstrated to be safe and developed a set of best practices for.
Vehicle tracking is also being implemented by some of the larger tanker companies. One
company, which MTI visited, uses tracking to monitor its fleet and drivers, and the system
includes a panic alarm.
However, there seems to be little federal interest or industry incentive to implement vehicle
tracking and immobilization technologies for gasoline or propane tankers. While PHMSA and
FMCSA have broadly recommended consideration of these technologies (and FMCSA has
repeatedly piloted these technologies), TSA—which has the regulatory lead for hazardous
materials security—has not recommended either tracking or immobilization for gasoline or
propane tankers.
The objective of merely protecting a small number of infrastructure targets is highly
unlikely to justify the cost of mandating fleetwide tracking and remote (as opposed to local)
immobilization, which would also be technically difficult to implement. However, a number
of lower-tech procedures can be implemented by state authorities to respond to threats,
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such as additional guards, CCTV cameras, and even the intentional the use of traffic signals
to create traffic jams that would make it far more difficult for a truck to reach its target,
assuming there is some warning. There are very few highway transportation infrastructure
targets that terrorists would likely attack and this therefore buttresses this conclusion.
However, the possibility of terrorists using gasoline tankers to attack targets other than
highway infrastructure suggests that tracking and local and remote immobilization could
have value, particularly when combined with the safety and efficiency benefits these
technologies would provide for the industry and the state.
Therefore, state authorities, the federal government, and industry associations should
reexamine the decision to exclude gasoline tankers from tracking, panic alarms, and
immobilization recommendations, and to find ways to encourage tanker companies to
implement these technologies.

Mineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence

67

Endnotes
1. We are aware that U.S. Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff
said on May 29, 2008, that Hezbollah “makes al Qaeda look like a minor league team”
and “poses the greatest threat to national security.” However, the United States is not
actively engaged in combat against Hezbollah, as it is against al Qaeda insurgents in Iraq
or Taliban/al Qaeda insurgents in Afghanistan; and while elements of Hezbollah have in
the past attacked American targets elsewhere, there have been no Hezbollah terrorist
attacks on American soil, nor to our knowledge, has Hezbollah called for such attacks. In
contrast, al Qaeda, which carried out the 9/11 attacks, continues to exhort its followers to
carry out attacks on American targets and in the United States. However, operationally it
makes little difference whether al Qaeda or Hezbollah occupies first place among terrorist
foes, as both entities have carried out large-scale truck bombings.
2. MC 330, MC 331, MC 306, and DOT 406 refer to tank trucks meeting specifications
established by DOT for transportation of authorized hazardous materials. MC 330 and MC
331 tank trucks carry liquefied or pressurized gases. MC 306 and DOT 406 are gasoline
tank trucks. MC refers to motor carrier designation for trucks manufactured to basic
specifications issued prior to 1995.
3. For safety and environmental reasons, some municipalities have moved away from
chlorine to other, less hazardous or non-hazardous materials and techniques. According to
a study released in 2007, since 1999, 25 water utilities, particularly those treating wastewater,
have switched to liquid bleach or ultraviolet light. See Paul Orum, The Terrorist Threat:
How Water Utilities Can Get Chlorine Off the Rails and Out of American Communities,
Center for American Progress, April 2007.
4. “Ton Tank” is a generic hazmat term that refers to portable tanks often transported by
trucks that carry about a ton of hazardous materials.
5. Wetlines are pipelines underneath a gasoline tank truck through which gasoline flows.
6. See “Public Information that Could Inspire and Inform Terrorists” beginning on page 25
for a more detailed account of this incident.
7. LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) is a mixture of gases usually derived from fossil fuel
sources. It is a mixture of propane, butane, and other flammable gases. Propane is a
product of natural gas processing or refining. Propane shipments constitute the majority of
highway shipments of flammable gases.
8. Argonne National Laboratory, Decision and Information Sciences Division, A National
Risk Analysis for Selected Materials in Transportation, Report #ANL/DIS 01-01, December
2002.
9. Although the system records “incidents,” we are calling them “accidents” because one
of the threshold requirements is carrier damage of at least $85,000, thus highly suggesting
a single of multivehicle crash or accident.
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10. $85,000 is a conservative figure, since the cost of replacing a gasoline tanker ranges
from $75,000 to $150,000.
11. We did not include cleanup and response costs because of the reporting focus on
actual damage to infrastructure.
12. The incident took place in Delano, California on July 2, 2007, and involved the release
of 4,789 gallons of organophosphorus, a liquid pesticide.
13. “Hazardous Materials Accident Summary Report: Overflow of Gasoline and Fire
at a Service Station-Convenience Store, Biloxi, Mississippi, August 9, 1998,” National
Transportation Safety Board, NTSB Number HZM-98/02; NTIS Number PB99-917007,
http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1999/HZM9902.htm, accessed January 6, 2010.
14. “Highway/Hazardous Materials Accident Summary Report: Collision of Tractor/Cargo
Tank Semitrailer and Passenger Vehicle and Subsequent Fire, Yonkers, New York, October
9, 1997,” National Transportation Safety Board, NTSB Number HAR-98/02/SUM; NTIS
Number PB98-916202, http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1998/HAR9802S.htm, accessed
January 6, 2010.
15. “Highway Accident Report: Gasoline Truck/AMTRAK Train Collision and Fire in Fort
Lauderdale, Florida, March 17, 1993,” National Transportation Safety Board, adopted
February 15, 1994, NTSB Number HAR-94/01, NTIS Number PB94-916201, http://www.
ntsb.gov/publictn/1998/HAR9802S.htm, accessed January 6, 2010.
16. Hazardous Materials Accident Report: Overturn of a Tractor-Semitrailer (Cargo Tank)
with the Release of Automotive Gasoline and Fire, Carmichael, California, February 13,
1991,” National Transportation Safety Board, adopted September 4, 1991, NTSB Number
HZM-91/01, NTIS Number PB91-917004, http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1991/HZM9101.
htm, accessed January 6, 2010.
17. “Highway Accident Report: Union Oil Company of California Tank Truck and Full
Trailer Overturn and Fire, Alaskan Way Viaduct, Seattle, Washington, December 4, 1975,”
National Transportation Safety Board, adopted July 28, 1976, NTSB Number HAR-76/07,
NTIS Number PB-257913/AS, http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1976/HAR7607.htm, accessed
January 6, 2010.
18. “Highway Accident Report: Propane Truck Collision with Bridge Column and Fire,
White Plains New York, July 27, 1994,” National Transportation Safety Board, adopted
November 14, 1995, NTSB Number HAR-95/02, NTIS Number PB95-914034/AS, http://
www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1995/HAR9502.htm, accessed January 6, 2010.
19. “Highway Accident Report: Surticas, S.A., Tank-Semitrailer Overturn, Explosion, and
Fire Near Eagle Pass, Texas, April 29, 1995,” National Transportation Safety Board,
adopted May 5, 1976, NTSB Number HAR-76/05, NTIS Number PB-254034/AS, http://
www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1976/HAR7604.htm, accessed January 6, 2010.
20. “Highway Accident Report: Multiple-Vehicle Collision Followed by Propylene CargoMineta Transportation Institute National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
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Tank Explosion, New Jersey Turnpike, Exit 8, September 21, 1972,” National Transportation
Safety Board, adopted October 17, 1973, NTSB Number HAR-73/04, NTIS Number PB225032/AS, http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1973/HAR7304.htm, accessed January 6, 2010.
21. “Highway Accident Report: Propane Tractor-Semitrailer Overturn and Fire, U.S. Route
501, Lynchburg, Virginia, March 9, 1972,” National Transportation Safety Board, adopted
May 24, 1973, NTSB Number HAR-73/03, NTIS Number PB-221986, http://www.ntsb.gov/
publictn/1973/HAR7303.htm, accessed January 6, 2010.
22. “Highway Accident Report: Automobile-Truck Collision Followed by Fire and Explosion
of Dynamite Cargo on U.S. Highway 78, Near Waco, Georgia, June 4, 1971,” National
Transportation Safety Board, adopted September 21, 1972, NTSB Number HAR-72/05,
NTIS Number PB-213129, http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1972/HAR7205.htm, accessed
January 6, 2010.
23. “Highway Accident Report: Transport Company of Texas Tractor-Semitrailer (Tank)
Collision with Bridge Column and Sudden Dispersal of Anhydrous Ammonia Cargo I-610 at
Southwest Freeway, Houston, Texas, May 11, 1976,” National Transportation Safety Board,
adopted April 14, 1977, NTSB Number HAR-77/01, NTIS Number PB-268251, http://www.
ntsb.gov/publictn/1977/HAR7701.htm, accessed January 6, 2010.
24. See http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/analysis_publications/heating_
brochure/heatbro.htm.
25. The TSA guidance can be found at http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/tsnm/highway/
hssm_sai.shtm.
26. See “2006 Corporate Security Review Summary: Motor Carrier, Motor Coach,
and School Bus,” Transportation Security Administration, Washington DC: 2006, and
“Assessment of Highway Mode Security: Corporate Security Review Results,” Highway
and Motor Carrier Division, TSA Transportation Sector Network Management Office,
Washington DC: May 2006, http://www.transportation.org/sites/security/docs/CSR%20
Highway%20Infrastructure%20Results%2011-06%20-%20final.pdf, accessed January 6,
2010.
27. See TSA web announcement at http:www.firstobserver.com.
28. “2 Men Plead Not Guilty to Gun, Bomb Plot Charges,” Los Angeles Times, December
21, 1999, p. 3.
29. Hawala: A system for remitting money, primarily in Islamic societies, in which a financial
obligation between two parties is settled by transferring it to a third party, as when money
owed by a debtor to a creditor is paid by a person who owes the debtor money. Hawala
transactions are usually based on trust and leave no written record. Definition from http://
www.thefreedictionary.com/hawala.
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Abbreviations and acronyms
ALOHA
ANFO
ATF
BLEVE
CASRAM
CCTV
CDL
CFR
CIA
CJIS
CSR
DHS
DMV
DOD
DOT
EFP
ERG
ERPG
EWEC
FBI
FHWA
FMCSA
FOUO
FTA
FY
GPS
GVWR
Hazmat, HM
HME
HMIRS
HMX
HPAC
IABTI
IME
IP
IRS
ISAC
JTTF
LC 50

Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres
Ammonia Nitrite Fuel Oil
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
Boiling Liquid Expanding-Volume Explosion
Chemical Accident Statistical Risk Assessment Model
Closed Circuit Television
Commercial Drivers License
Code of Federal Regulations
Central Intelligence Agency
Criminal Justice Information Services
Corporate Security Review
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Motor Vehicles
Department of Defense
United States Department of Transportation
Explosively Formed Projectiles
Emergency Response Guidebook
Emergency Response Planning Guidelines
Emergency Warning and Education Center
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Federal Highway Administration
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
For Official Use Only
Federal Transit Administration
Fiscal Year
Global Positioning System
Gross Vehicle Weight Rating
Hazardous Materials
Hazardous Materials Endorsement
Hazardous Materials Information Reporting System
Cyclotetramethlene-Tetranitramine (An Explosive)
Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability
International Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators
Institute of Makers of Explosives
Infrastructure Protection
Internal Revenue Service
Information Sharing & Analysis Center
Joint Terrorism Task Force
Lethal Concentration 50
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Abbreviations and Acronyms

LCV
Longer Combination Vehicle
LPG
Liquefied Petroleum Gas
MC
Motor Carrier
MCS
Motor Carrier Safety
MG/M3
Milligrams Per Cubic Meter
MTI
Mineta Transportation Institute
NICC
National Infrastructure Coordination Center
NTSB
National Transportation Safety Board
NTSCOE
National Transportation Security Center of Excellence
NYSE
New York Stock Exchange
OSD-ATL
Office of The Secretary of Defense
PETN
Pentaerythritol Tetranitrate (Explosive also Known as Pentrite)
PHMSA
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
PIH
Poison Inhalation Hazard
PPM
Parts Per Million
PTDI
Professional Truck Driver Institute
RDX
Cyclotrimethylenetrinitrammine (an Explosive)
RICO
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
SAIC
Science Applications International Corporations
SDDC
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
SSI
Sensitive Security Information
STA
Security Threat Assessments
TIH
Toxic Inhalation Hazard
TNT
Trinitrotoluene (an Explosive)
TRB
Transportation Research Board
TSA
Transportation Security Administration
VBIED
Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
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